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The Armenians of Tsarist Russia was in a promising situation with their 
immense impact on economic, cultural and political affairs of Transcaucasia until the 
last two decades of the 19th century, which saw major changes as regards to their 
position in the Russian Empire. This thesis examines the dynamics of this difficult 
period for the Armenians by investigating the Tsarist policies, which produced a 
complex picture for the Russian Armenians. In addition, another important factor, the 
influence of the Russian revolutionary movement on the Armenian revolutionary 
groups on theoretical and organizational levels is explained. 
By 1880’s, the combination of these factors caused the emergence of an 
unfavourable Tsarist treatment of its Armenian subjects in line with the general 
Russification policy. In the specified period, Russian foreign policy interests about the 
Armenian Question made things even worse for the Russian Armenians. The study 
explores this downward trend, which was to be culminated in the Tsarist decision to 
confiscate the Armenian Church properties in 1903. The Armenian response to this, 
intermingled in the broader course of the 1905 Revolution, was an important 
dimension for the fates of not only the Russian Armenians but also the Ottoman 
Armenians.  
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ERMENĐLER VE ÇARLIK RUSYASI 
(1870-1906) 
Önol, Onur 
Master tezi, Uluslararası Đlişkiler Bölümü 





Çarlık Rusyası Ermenileri, 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısının büyük bir bölümünde 
Transkafkasya’nın ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasi meseleleri üzerinde muazzam bir etki 
sahibiydiler. Bu yüzyılın son yirmi yılında ise, Ermenilerin Rusya imparatorluğu 
içindeki etkin pozisyonları büyük değişikliklere uğradı. Bu tez, Rusya Ermenileri için 
karmaşık bir durum ortaya çıkaran Çarlık politikalarını inceleyerek Rusya Ermenileri 
için oldukça zorlu geçen bu dönemin dinamiklerini araştırmaktadır. Ayrıca, bir diğer 
önemli faktör olarak, Rus devrimci hareketinin Ermeni devrimci gruplar üzerindeki 
teorik ve örgütsel düzeydeki etkisi açıklanmaktadır. 
1880’lere gelindiğinde bu etmenlerin birleşmesi, genel Ruslaştırma siyasetine 
paralel olarak Çarlık Ermenilerine karşı olumsuz bir tutumun ortaya çıkmasına yol 
açmıştır. Bu dönemde, Rusya’nın Ermeni Meselesi ilgili dış politika çıkarları 
Rusya’daki Ermenilerin durumunu daha da kötüleştirmiştir. Bu çalışma, 1903’te 
Çarlık rejiminin Ermeni kilisesinin mallarını müsadere etme kararı ile sonuçlanan bu 
kötüye gidişi incelemektedir. Buna karşı gelişen ve 1905 Devrimi’nin dinamikleri ile 
iç içe giren Ermeni tepkisi, sadece Rus Ermenilerinin değil aynı zamanda Osmanlı 
Ermenilerinin kaderleri için de önemli bir boyut idi. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Devrimci Ermeni Partileri, Çarlık Milliyetler Politikası, 
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This is not a story with a happy ending. In 1918, the Armenians tried to set up 
an independent Armenia, the successor to a shadowy mediaeval kingdom, with 
borders on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Its capital would have been Kars. 
Ten thousand Turks arrived outside the place in October 1920, and the Armenians, 
25,000 of them, left in a hurry.1 It was the end of a dream, yet another disappointment 
in the history of the nation. From that day to this, Armenians have blamed the West 
for letting them down. 
However, we have to move on from nationalist mythology. The Armenians of 
the Ottoman Empire had lived for a thousand years quite comfortably, and were 
known as millet-i sadıka, the Christians you could rely on. They built the palaces, 
staffed the embassies, did the theatre and the opera, and even bank-rolled the Turkish 
nationalists in 1919.  
                                               
1
 For a detailed account of this scene, please see Richard G. Hovannisian, Between Crescent and 
Sickle: Partition and Sovietization, vol.4 of The Republic of Armenia (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
 2 
Something then went badly wrong, and it all ended up with the disaster of 
Kars in 1920. The Turkish general who took the place in October 1920 could not even 
find anyone to accept the surrender because the Armenian generals were all hiding. 
And yet, the Armenians are people of enormous intelligence and adaptability. Why 
did they end up in disappointment? 
A good part of the story ends up with Tsarist Russia. It was Tsarist Russia that 
created Armenia, and this is a side of things that deserves exploration. For the Russian 
Armenians there is the further peculiarity that they were influenced inevitably by 
developments, economic or intellectual, in the late-Tsarist period. It is the subject of 
the present thesis. We have had to look in essence at three big subjects. The first is the 
extraordinary commercial success of the Armenians in Russia. Especially, as oil grew 
in the later nineteenth century, they were all over the place. Baku and Tiflis were 
really Armenia. The next question is difficult: why did Armenians have various 
problems with their neighbours and the Russian bureaucracy. The Tsar closed down 
their church, top officials prepared hostile reports, Georgians and Azeris put an anti-
Armenian element to their national identity. Our third question is as to how the 
Armenians developed a Russian revolutionary consciousness. 
There is a considerable difficulty in this subject, in that the literature is partial. 
Major exceptions to this are Ronald Grigor Suny’s Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia 
in Modern History and Manuel Sarkisyanz’s A History of Transcaucasian Armenia, 
both of which describe the social, economic and cultural lives of the Russian 
Armenians in the second half of the 19th century.2 More specifically, the Armenian 
impact on late imperial Tiflis has been put into perspective again by Suny and several 
                                               
2
 Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993); Manuel Sarkisyanz, A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia: Social, 
Cultural, and Political (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975). 
 3 
other scholars, as well as various travellers’ accounts.3 For Baku and Armeno- Azeri 
relations, the major works are those of Suny, Swietochowski, Mostashari and Altstadt, 
who also managed to describe the ethnic tensions between these two groups.4 
 It is an interesting point that the bulk of the Armenian revolutionary 
movement originated in the Russian Empire, whereas the major focus of the 
Armenian revolutionaries had always been the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. As 
such, the Tsarist dimension of the Armenian national awakening and its 
transformation into an active revolutionary movement has been less emphasized than 
what happened to the Ottoman Armenians.  
In this sense, Vartan Gregorian’s article is very useful as a general survey on 
the Russian impact on the Armenians, including the revolutionary tradition.5 The 
ideology of the Armenian revolutionary tradition, especially its nationalist dimension, 
has been explained very thoroughly by scholars such as Louise Z. Nalbandian, 
Anahide Ter Minassian and Gerard J. Libaridian.6 A comprehensive history of 
Dashnaksutiun by Hratch Dasnabedian is also very useful.7 Thus, one has still to look 
                                               
3
 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (London: Tauris, 1989); Stephen F. Jones, 
Socialism in Georgian Colours: The European Road to Social Democracy, 1883-1917 (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard UP, 2005); James Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in 
the Autumn of 1876, 4th ed. (London; New York: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1896); Harry Finnis B. 
Lynch, Armenia: Travels and Studies, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1901). 
4
 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian 
Revolution (Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1972); Tadeusz Swietochowski, Müslüman Cemaatten 
Ulusal Kimliğe Rus Azerbaycanı 1905-1920, trans. Nuray Mert (Đstanbul: Bağlam, 1988), Firouzeh 
Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus (London: Tauris, 
2006); Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992). 
5
 Vartan Gregorian, “The Impact of Russia on the Armenians and Armenia,” in Russia and Asia: 
Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1972). 
6
 Louise Ziazan Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian 
Political Parties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); Gerard J. Libaridian, Modern 
Armenia: People, Nation, State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2004); Anahide Ter 
Minassian, “Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887-1912),” in 
Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia, rev. ed., ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (T. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983). 
7
 Hratch Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924) 
(Milan: OEMME Edizioni, 1989). 
 4 
into the general characteristics of the Russian model to analyze the process in which 
Armenian revolutionary movement draws on from Russian tutelage.8 
 The fate of the Russian Armenians was also affected by the general policies 
initiated by the Tsarist regime. Thus, the extension of the Great Reform process into 
Transcaucasia, the modernization drive of Witte or Tsarist nationality policies 
changed the lives of all subject nationalities and the Armenians were no exception.9 
Being the major Russian policy that affected the fate of the Armenians, the 
Russification policies were delicately discussed in various works, though the 
Armenian dimension was often taken as a part of a broader picture.10 
 Another chief determinant of the Tsarist policy towards the Russian 
Armenians was the foreign policy dimension. Being a question of international 
diplomacy in the Berlin Congress, the discussions of autonomy or reform for Armenia 
was on the Russian foreign policy agenda. Thus, Russian foreign policy interests in 
the Armenian Question had their implications for the Russian Armenians. Owing to 
its international character, the foreign policy dimension has been scrutinized by 
several scholars in detail.11  
                                               
8
 Franco Venturi, The Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 
Nineteenth Century Russia, trans. Francis Haskell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960); Tibor 
Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London: Fontana Press, 1988). 
9
 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, trans. Alfred Clayton (Harlow, UK: 
Longman, 2001); Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 
1917-1923, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Pr., 1964); Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age 
of Modernization and Revolution: 1881-1917 (London: Longman, 1983). 
10
 Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in 
the Age of Lenin and Stalin, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); S. Frederick Starr, “Tsarist Government: The Imperial Dimension," in Soviet 
Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael (New York: Praeger, 1978); Geoffrey 
Hosking, Russia, People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
11
 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1956); Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya: XVII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar 
Türk-Rus ilişkileri 1798-1919 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1970); Arman J. Kirakossian, British 
Diplomacy and the Armenian Question: from the 1830s to 1914 (Princeton, NJ: Gomidas Insitute 
Books, 2003); Manoug Joseph Somakian, Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-
1920 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London: 
Macmillan, St Martin's Press, 1966);  B. A. Borian, Armeniia, mezhdunarodnaia diplomatiia i SSSR, 
vol. 1 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1928). 
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 For the confiscation of the properties of the Armenian Church by the Tsarist 
administration, Paul Werth’s article along with others is very instructive.12 The next 
critical phase for the Russian Armenians was their participation in the ‘dress rehearsal 
to the Revolution’ in 1905 and its aftermath. Again, the works of Libaridian, Suny, 
Minassian are very informative about the Armenian ingredient, while the classic 
works of Pipes, Figes and Ascher illuminates the broader course of the Revolution.13  
 Therefore, I will try to look into the position of Armenians and their national 
movement in Tsarist Russia by starting with a general survey of the Armenian 
national awakening in the first chapter. Then, in the second chapter, I will describe the 
political, economic and cultural realities of the Russian Armenians by 1870, when 
hopes were high due to the Great reform process in the imperial Russia. The other 
major phenomenon that influenced not only Russian but also Armenian lives was the 
Russian revolutionary movement. In the third chapter, I will try to analyze the 
Russian legacy on the Armenian revolutionary movement. Next, I will describe how 
the series of anti-Armenian policies of the Tsarist administration in last two decades 
of the 19th and foreign policy interests influenced the Armenian revolutionary 
movement. In the last chapter, the final confrontation of the Armenian revolutionaries 
with the Tsarist regime in the revolution of 1905 and its results will be explained. 
                                               
12
 Paul W. Werth, “Glava Tserkvi, Poddannyi Imperatora: Armianskii Katolikos na Perekrestke 
Vnutrennei i Vneshnei Politiki Imperii, 1828-1914,” Ab Imperio, Issue: 3 (2006): 99-138. 
13
 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (London: Collins Harvill, 1990); Orlando Figes, 
A People's Tragedy: the Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1998); 
Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1988); Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored (Stanford, CA: Stanford 










2.1. The Challenge of Secular Elements to the Domination of the Clergy in the 
Ottoman Empire 
 
It is surprising to note how the attitude of the Tsarist regime vis-à-vis its 
Armenian subjects changed during the last quarter of the 19th century. A great 
productive force with their abilities in commerce and vital Diaspora networks 
stretching from India to Italy, Armenians were fairly desirable elements for the 
Russian Empire, which was trying to increase its control over Transcaucasia. With 
their Catholicos as their spiritual, and to a certain extent political leader, Russian 
Armenians were considered to be beneficial and peaceful allies of Tsarist Russia. In 
fact, the deal went on quite well until 1870’s, when the intellectual phase began to 
incorporate revolutionary features borrowed from their Russian counterparts. One 
must look into the process of this national awakening, which took its early steps in the 
Ottoman Empire and then flourished in the Russian Empire. 
 7 
The Ottoman Armenian community was administered by the regulations of 
millet system, in which the Armenian Patriarchate and the Armenian elite (amiras) 
dominated affairs. The Armenian Patriarch was not only the religious leader; he also 
administered education, tax collection and cultural affairs.14 On the other hand, 
amiras were very influential in financial life of the Empire and assumed important 
bureaucratic posts. Particularly, sarraf (money changer) amiras had immense 
economic power as their credits were the backbone of the iltizam system.15 
This system worked quite well; the general situation of the Ottoman Empire 
did not. When it was decided to respond to the decline of the Empire by increased 
centralization and modernization with the Tanzimat reforms of 1839, the fate of the 
Armenians was also to change. “This religious-communal system gradually gave way 
to a national oriented one due to modernization efforts, changes in the iltizam system 
and the economic rise of secular elements within the Armenian millet.”16 In this sense, 
the Tanzimat reforms ultimately undermined the prestige of the Armenian Patriarchate 
by paving the way for secular elements. 
Although there always was a certain degree of interaction between the 
Armenians and Europe mainly due to the diaspora Armenians and merchant links, the 
nineteenth century definitely saw an intensification of this. In turn, increased 
interaction with the West provided Armenian intermediaries with more financial 
power; and a more secular outlook. Armenian merchants, artisans and eventually 
                                               
14
 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), 13. 
15
 Hagop Barsoumian, “The Dual Role of the Armenian Amira Class within the Ottoman Government 
and the Armenian Millet (1750-1850),” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning 
of a Plural Society, vol.1, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier 
Publishers, 1982), 172-173. Mültezims needed to have a certificate from an Armenian sarraf to be 
included in the auction. Barsoumian, 173.  
16
 Kemal H. Karpat, “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and the State in 
the Post-Ottoman Era,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural 
Society, vol. 1, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 
1982), 141-143. 
 8 
intelligentsia began to consider the clergy as an inert institution and later openly 
challenged its leadership in the affairs of the community.17 
As the financial power of the sarraf amiras deteriorated as they lost their 
privileges in credit provision, smaller artisans (esnafs) and merchants found support 
from reform minded bureaucratic amiras.18 The efforts of the government to increase 
centralization and the sense of citizenship further benefited this group. As the 
Armenian Church was now expected to pay taxes for its holdings except for the ones 
in Istanbul, the lower classes stepped up to contribute in the way of taxes, which in 
turn gave them the opportunity to play an active role in the politics of the Armenian 
community.19 
The final challenge of these secular elements to the Armenian Patriarchate and 
amira bloc was realized with the manifestation of the Armenian National Constitution 
(Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyan) in 1863, according to which the Civil Council had 
dominated the Religious Council in the civil management of the Armenians.20 Since 
these councils were elected by the Armenian millet, the power of the high clergy and 
the amiras was seriously curtailed.21 The Patriarch even lost his power to dismiss 
spiritual leaders.22 Thus, the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire strengthened 
the secular elements of the Armenian millet, which would assume the pioneering role 
in the national awakening process.  
 It is also important to note that in this secular challenge to Armenian clergy 
and amiras, the official recognition of Armenian Catholic in 1831 and the Armenian 
                                               
17
 Karpat, 158-159. Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 10. 
18
 Barsoumian, 180. Davison, 120. 
19
 Vartan Artinian, The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1863: A Study of 
its Historical Development (Đstanbul, 1988), 53-54. 
20
 K. V. Sarkissian, “The Armenian Church,” in Religion in the Middle East, vol. 1, ed. A. J. Arberry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 501. 
21
 Mesrob K. Krikorian, Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire 1860-1908 (London: 
Routledge, 1977), 3-5. 
22
 Esat Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi. 2nd ed. (Đstanbul: Belge, 1987), 150. 
 9 
Protestants in 1850 as separate millets played a vital role. As the flock of the 
Armenian Patriarchate was now divided, the missionaries arrived in to benefit from 
this division. In the first place, missionaries in the Ottoman Empire provided a serious 
opportunity for the Armenians; particularly for the provincial ones, in terms of 
educational progress, which was increasingly demanded due to increased contacts 
with the West and the need for modernization.23  
This demand was to be provided especially by the Protestant missionaries who 
rapidly expanded their networks at the expense of the power of the Armenian 
Patriarchate. From the accounts of Protestant missionaries, it is understood that they 
supported lower classes to undermine the dominance of the Church and the amiras, 
who were traditionally the allies of the regime.24 The missionary efforts were not 
limited to educational enterprises.  By the mid 19th century, missionary scriptures in 
Armenian and Armeno-Turkish, mainly published in Smyrna, reached considerable 
distribution levels, which contributed to the Armenian revival by increasing mass 
literacy.25  
 Moreover, as the students of these missionary schools could embrace Western 
ideas more quickly, this was an important dimension of the Armenian national 
awakening.26 Apart from the ideas, the Western impact on the Ottoman Empire was 
rising and naturally they established close economic ties with the Armenians as 
intermediaries since they were more open to this sort of influence in terms of culture 
                                               
23
 Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, Anadolu’daki Amerika: Kendi Belgeleriyle 19.Yüzyılda Osmanlı 
Đmparatorluğu'ndaki Amerikan Misyoner Okulları, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Đmge, 2000), 57-59. 
24
 Ibid., 56. 
25
 Robert Mirak, Torn Between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 23. It is also worth noting that it was an American missionary, 
Dr. Elias Riggs, who first translated the Bible into vernacular Armenian in 1847. Harry Jewell Sarkiss, 
“The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863,” The Journal of Modern History 9, no. 4 (December 1937): 
444-445. 
26
 Mirak, 26-27. 
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with the sons of better-off Armenians going to European universities and their 
mastery of Western languages.27 
 Therefore, the first phase of the Armenian national awakening in the Ottoman 
Empire started with a challenge to the Armenian clergy by the secular elements. This 
process went on with the discussions of language reform, education policies and the 
emergence of a national Armenian literature, which produced very complex outcomes 
for the Armenians on the other side of the border. 
 
 
2.2. The Russian Armenians Before the National Awakening 
 
With the Treaty of Turkmenchai of 1828, the Russian Empire acquired a 
considerable number of Armenian subjects. The Armenian population went up with 
immigration from Ottoman Empire and Persia from 1828 onwards.28 Walker, quite 
rightly, thinks that the settlement of these Armenian immigrants in the Armianskaia 
oblast (Armenian district) was an important step for the future national awakening 
since this would provide a territorial basis for a collective identity.29 There was also a 
strategic consideration in this. The Russians were very eager to settle those 
Armenians to Christianize the region and to form a buffer region against two 
neighbouring Muslim empires.30 
                                               
27
 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
62. 
28
 Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: the Survival of a Nation, rev. 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1990), 54, John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (1908; repr., Richmond, 
Surrey: Curzon Caucasus World, 1999), 223. It is also important to keep in mind that many Muslims of 
Transcaucasia left the region for Ottoman Empire after the 1828, which also changed the demographic 
balance in favor of Armenians.  
29
 Walker, 55. 
30
 Firouzeh Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus (London: 
Tauris, 2006), 41-42. 
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As a part of the administrative reforms of Nicholas I, Russian Armenians were 
put under the Polozhenie (Statute) in 1836. According to this, the Armenian Church 
was granted the right to control parish education network, exemption from taxation 
and ownership of the land for income in return for the supervision of the Church by a 
prokurator (procurator) appointed by the Holy Synod.31 Moreover, the Tsar had the 
authority for the final decision to appoint the Catholicos. Although this system 
resembled the treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, as the 
Armenian community was defined in religious lines and the Catholicos was 
considered as their head, there were crucial differences. According to this 
arrangement, the influence of the laity in the organization of the Armenian Church 
was relatively less than it was in the arrangements in the Ottoman and Persian 
Empires. In line with the Byzantine tradition of State-Church relationship in the 
Russian Empire, the role of clergy in the affairs of the Church remained dominant 
until the abolition of the Polozhenie.32  
The Catholicosal Synod and dioceses were completely controlled by the 
Armenian clergymen, under Russian supervision; there was no laity.33 Apart from the 
administrative supervision of the Armenian Catholicosate by the Holy Synod, there 
was also a religious aspect. In the official documents, the Russians always used the 
term ‘Gregorian Church’ not to highlight the apostolic character of the Armenian 
Church, which was always a source of bitterness for the Armenians.34  
                                               
31
 Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 123.  
32
 K. V. Sarkissian, “The Armenian Church”, 495. In the Catholicos election of 1843, only 5 of 26-men 
council were laity. Manuel Sarkisianz, A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia: Social, Cultural, 
and Political (Leiden, Netherlands:  E.J. Brill, 1975), 55.  
33
 Malachia Ormanian, The Church of Armenia: Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy, 
Literature and Existing Condition, trans. G. Marcar Gregory (London: A.R. Mowbray, 1955), 155. 
Being a former Patriarch, Ormanian believes that the idea of giving liberties, efforts to increase 
participation of lay elements in the affairs of Armenians was a mistake. 
34
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Nonetheless, the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin was also considered by the 
Tsarist regime as a useful agent that would influence not only the Russian Armenians 
but also Ottoman Armenians. Thus, being severely obedient to the Tsarist lines, the 
Catholicosate was officially honored by various ways to bolster its prestige.35 With 
the establishment of Kavkazskoe Namestnichestvo (Caucasian Viceregency) in 1844, 
the limits of the Armenian Church in the Tsarist administrative mechanism were 
redrawn. While namestnik (viceroy) Prince Mikhail S. Vorontsov made the Armenian 
bourgeoisie of Transcaucasia allies of the regime, severe limitations on to the 
Armenian Catholicosate were put. With the law of 1856, the Catholicos was put under 
strict jurisdiction of viceroy to a point in which he was forbidden to approach the 
Tsarist ministries directly.36  
Still, it would be fair to say that the Armenian Church was the dominant 
element in the affairs of the Russian Armenians by mid 19th century. From then on, 
secular elements among the Russian Armenians became a real factor on drawing from 
the experiences of Ottoman Armenians. Their first target was to break the monopoly 
of the Armenian Church on the Armenian language.  
 
 
2.3. The Transformation of the Armenian Language 
 
By the early 19th century, religion was the defining quality of the Armenian 
both in the Russian and Ottoman Empires. However, the emerging ideas of 
nationalism from the West began to infiltrate into the empires of the East as the idea 
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of common language and history gradually became the themes which Armenian 
intellectuals began to take up. The emergence of this sort of national revival, though 
fiercely opposed by the Armenian Church, had been very influential in the Armenian 
politics. Being one of the critical components of such a revival, the language had an 
immense importance in this.  
 The Armenian language was created as a literary language, much different 
from the vernacular to keep the nation away from assimilation by surrounding 
Empires.37 Thus, written classical Armenian was confined to a very limited group of 
people, namely to the clergy of the Armenian Church. On the other hand, the 
vernacular of Western Armenians had been influenced by Turkish and Arabic, while 
the Eastern Armenian dialect borrowed a great deal from Russian and Georgian.38 For 
instance, by the first half of the 19th century, Turkish words constituted 85% of 
Western Armenian vernacular.39 The events succeeding the French Revolution and 
the need to mobilize the masses by education eventually led Armenian intellectuals to 
think what to do about the duality of classical and vernacular Armenian.  
In order to understand the background of this process of the rediscovery of the 
Armenian language, one must turn to the efforts of the Mekhitarists, the Catholic 
Armenian order, as the main driving force of the Armenian renaissance (Veradzmunt) 
period which preceded the national awakening (Zartonk).40 In the 18th century, based 
on Venice and Vienna, these Armenian monks published various books ranging from 
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Armenian grammar books to the first complete history of the Armenians.41 The efforts 
of the order were to continue with regards to the Armenians of the Russian Empire. 
When the Armenians were trying to set up their schooling in accordance with the 
Russian education system, it was a Mekhitarist, Minas Bzhshkian, who published his 
Kerakanutiun ruserenhayeren Rossiisko-Armianskaia grammatika (Russian-
Armenian Grammar) and Kerakanutiun haykazian lezvi batsadreal i rusats barbar 
Armiano-Russkaia grammatika (Grammar of the Armenian language explained in the 
Russian language).42 
 As the Mekhitarists formed the foundations of the interest in Armenian 
language, the secular intellectuals stepped in. In this aspect, Khachatur Abovian was 
one of the scholars, who contributed to the transformation of the language. Having 
assisted the German scholar, Friedrich Parrot on his visit to Transcaucasia in 1829, he 
was invited by the professor to study at Dorpat University, where Abovian realized 
the importance of the vernacular and the literacy for the masses in the way of national 
consciousness.43 Moreover, with the increased importance of the printing press, the 
need to standardize the Armenian language so as to reach the masses became 
obvious.44  
Hence, between 1840 and 1870, the conflict between the advocates of classical 
Armenian and those of the vernacular went on. Understandably, the Armenian clergy 
did not want to lose their monopoly on language. Classicist linguists, mainly the 
Armenian clergy and the Mekhitarists, claimed that employing the Classical 
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Armenian was a better choice, although they realized that their plan was socially 
unfeasible given the dispersed condition of the Armenians and the differences 
between the classical and the vernacular.45 Even a Mekhitarist abbot, who had major 
works on Armenian grammar, Arsen Aytenian, had to admit by the 1860’s that 
vernacular Armenian should be the standard language although it indicated the end of 
the monopoly of Church on the Armenian literature.46  
Finally, for the Tsarist Armenians, the transition to the vernacular was 
complete by 1860, easier than their Western counterparts perhaps due to the lack of 
culturally strong amiras and the existence of a more advanced printed press.47 The 
Ottoman Armenians followed the pattern and by 1870’s, the triumph of vernacular 
over the classical Armenian was certain and parallel to that the Armenian literature 
began to acquire a more secular character. 
 
 
2.4. The Golden Age of Armenian Literature 
 
 In line with an increased interest in the Armenian language, literature began to 
flourish in the 1840’s. The Ottoman Armenians produced a number of translations of 
Western literature and books expressing the love of land and nation. The first 
Armenian theatre in Istanbul, where plays often touched on Armenian national 
subjects and figures, was opened in 1856.48 On the other side of the border, the 
literature that the Russian Armenians produced differed from the Western, mainly 
because of the influence of German and Russian currents of thought. While the works 
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of German romantics led Armenian students and intellectuals to think about a 
common Armenian history and fatherland, the writings of Alexander I. Herzen, 
Mikhail A. Bakunin and Vissarion G. Belinsky created a growing interest in the 
exploitation of the ordinary Armenian.49  
Bardakjian asserts that Armenian writers admired Russian literature, especially 
the narodnichestvo (populism) phase which inspired Armenian intellectuals to 
formulate the Armenian identity by depicting the common Russian peasant and his 
sorrows.50 As a primary example in vernacular, Verk Hayastani (The Wounds of 
Armenia), the famous novel of Abovian, demonstrated the sufferings of the 
Armenians under Turkish and Persian rule.51 The devotion to the Armenian 
fatherland, virtues of the common man and the need to act against the foreign rule 
were pivotal themes of the novel.52 Another good example of narodnik (populist) 
literary influence could be found in the writings of Perch Proshian, who idealized the 
common people of Armenian village.53 Thus, this romantic phase of Eastern 
Armenian literature between 1860 and 1890 had certainly to do with the Russian 
populist ideas of the time since both dwelled on similar themes regarding the common 
man.54 
This period (from 1840’s on) also witnessed an immense spread of Armenian 
journals. Masis (Ararat) (1852-1908) in Istanbul; Hiusisapail (Northern Lights) 
(1858-62, 1864) in Moscow and Mshak (The Tiller) (1872-1921), Nor dar (New 
Century) (1883-1916), Murj (Hammer) (1889-1907) in Tiflis were some of these 
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Armenian journals.55 This expansion of secular Armenian literature was in some 
aspects anti-clerical. For example, Mikayel Nalbandian’s newspaper Hiusisapail, 
which was published in ashkharhabar (vernacular Armenian) in Moscow between 
1858 and 1864, had an anti-clerical tone.56  
The articles criticizing the Church and supporting the language reform were 
points of interest not just for the Armenians but also the Tsarist officials, who arrested 
Nalbandian, perhaps on the insistence of the Armenian clergy.57 The heritage of 
Nalbandian was followed by Mshak, which was founded by Grigor Artsruni in Tiflis 
in 1872 and survived till 1920. Considering the dispersed condition of Armenians, 
“the expansion of these journals, later continued with the revolutionary ones, provided 
a vital connection between dispersed Armenian communities.”58 
Hence, the novels of Abovian, Proshian and secular journals contributed to the 
development of national identity and made the minds of Armenian community ready 
for a nationalist resurgence in the years to come.59 According to Panossian, on the 
whole, “the Eastern Armenian literature was more effective in creating a collective 
Armenian identity among the common Armenians than its Western counterpart with 
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2.5. The Growth of Schools 
 
The Russian expansion in the Caucasus naturally resulted in a rise of the 
Armenian population in the Russian Empire, which encouraged Armenians to 
consider their education system. Prior to the annexation of the region by the Russians, 
the Armenians of the region did not have a proper schooling system, perhaps with the 
exception of a few parish schools of the Armenian Church.61 At the basic level, parish 
schools were very important since it was in those institutions where Armenians 
learned their language, religion and culture. As the Armenians made their integration 
into the political and economic life of the Tsarist Empire, their schooling system 
improved. By 1836, the number of Armenian parish schools in the Russian Empire 
reached 21.62  
The other aspect of the educational development was related to the 
establishment of higher education institutions. After finishing the district parish 
school, a bright Armenian student had limited choices. Although the Russian state 
gimnaziias (high school) and universities were accepting Armenians, it was the 
seminaries, which took the burden of handling the Armenian higher education in 
Transcaucasia. An important institution in this sense was the Nersessian Seminary in 
Tiflis, which was named after the Catholicos Nerses Ashtaraketsi as he led the 
establishment of it in 1825.63 Along with the Gevorkian Seminary, which was 
founded later in 1874 in Echmiadzin, these seminaries produced the bulk of Armenian 
intellectuals of the Russian Empire.64  
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Considering the fact that the seminaries were, in effect, the only means of 
higher education and a critical source of revolutionaries in Transcaucasia, the 
products of these Armenian seminaries would be important in the political life of their 
fellows in Tsarist Russia. Another important one was the Lazarev Academy in 
Moscow, which functioned as an institution for higher education for Armenians, and 
produced important characters like Mikayel Loris-Melikov. It was transformed into 
Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in 1827 and by 1850’s, and the courses taught 
in the academy mainly included oriental studies and Armenology.65  
The expansion of educational facilities of the Russian Armenians also affected 
the Ottoman Armenians. Mkrtich Sanassarian, also a product of Nersessian Seminary 
and a Tiflis Armenian bourgeois, set up one of the most influential Armenian colleges 
in the Ottoman Empire: the Sanassarian College in Erzurum.66 The impact of Russian 
Armenians went on as many graduates of these Armenian seminaries in Transcaucasia 
found their ways as teachers in the Sanassarian College.67 
The alliance of the enterprising Armenian bourgeoisie of Transcaucasia with 
the Russian regime was important in this. “In return for a better treatment by the 
Tsarist regime, the Armenian bourgeoisie supported the regime by being loyal to it, 
sending their children to Russian gimnaziias and adopting Russified surnames.”68 The 
alliance was further strengthened with the advent of Vorontsov in 1845 as the first 
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viceroy of Caucasus when the education system of the region began to be fully 
incorporated to the Imperial system and state district schools were founded.69  
In 1850, three year elementary schools of which the language of instruction 
was Armenian were opened by the Armenian Church and within ten years the number 
of such schools reached 29.70 In addition, the gimnaziias in the region included 
Armenian, Georgian and Turkish courses in their curriculums.71 In line with their 
skills, a commercial gimnaziia, mainly for Armenians, was opened in Tiflis in 1851.72 
Then came the period of Great Reforms, which included a general expansion of 
primary school network in the Russian Empire; the Armenians were no exception. 
Under Catholicos Gevork IV, who was the Catholicos between 1866 and 1882, new 
parish schools, with new curriculums, were opened.73  
 Of course this trend created new types of Armenians in Tsarist Russia. Among 
the products of this growth of education were influential Armenians such as Abovian 
and Stepan Nazarian74, who challenged the influence of the Armenian Church by 
means of language and literature. Having being educated in Moscow, Abovian was 
surely influenced by the lively debates in the Russian kruzhki (circle) and Western 
literature. These sorts of secular men were a source of irritation for the Armenian 
Church, which tried to impose a strict control over their acts and publications with the 
help of the Russian police.75 
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Another influence regarding the national awakening had to do with the 
Armenian students in the other parts of the Empire. In the Russian Empire, having no 
universities in Transcaucasia, Armenian students went to Russian universities to study 
where Russian and European ideas of the time made their impact.76 Coupled with the 
local conditions, the Eastern Armenians became more prone to the revolutionary 
cause than their Ottoman brethren. On the other hand, the Ottoman Armenians, who 
were sent abroad, mostly to France and Italy, was advocating for reforms and 
constitutionalism.77 
 With the efforts of modernizing the language, development of a patriotic 
literature and the growth of schools, the emphasis on the nationality began to prevail 
over that of religion. The momentum of the time was perhaps best described by the 
words of Stepan Vosgan: “Rally around the concept Haistan (Armenia) not that of 
religion.”78 This was an indication that the preparation phase of the Armenian national 
awakening had made a huge progress. However, by 1870, this national revival was 
confronted with the Tsarist reforms and various responses from their neighbours in 
the region. 
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By 1870, the Armenian national revival had mainly a cultural and intellectual 
character. In the era of nationalism, experiences of other nations were borrowed as 
Armenian intellectuals contemplated their common Armenian history, language and 
mass literacy. Not surprisingly, this was the work of a small group of urban 
Armenians, who had to reach their fellow-Armenians in their villages in Erevanskaia 
guberniia (Erevan province) or the Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis, who prospered 
under the Tsarist administration. It is the economic primacy of these Tiflis Armenians 
that created a lively cultural atmosphere, which helped the formation of men like 
Kristapor Mikaelian.  
This decade was also one of great economic and social changes with the 
advent of railways, increased monetarization of economy and foreign trade. In 
addition, the Tsarist government introduced municipality and land reforms by 1870’s 
into Transcaucasia. It was the combination of expanding Armenian national 
awakening and these massive political and economic changes in Tsarist Russia that 
produced the bulk of revolutionary cadres of future Armenian revolutionary parties. 
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It is also important to note that these changes also brought up a new dimension 
with the relationship of Armenians with their neighbours. Georgians, with their 
traditional capital dominated by the Armenians, added an anti-Armenian element to 
their national demands. The fiery polemics between Ilia Chavchavadze and Grigor 
Artsruni in this period were no coincidence.79 On the other hand, Azeris were no 
happier to witness the educational, economic and cultural level of their Armenian 
neighbours. Therefore, it is worth looking into the life of Russian Armenians and the 
changes occurred from 1870 on, which complicated their relationship with the Tsarist 
regime and their neighbours.  
 
 
3.1. Erevan  
 
By the early 19th century, Erevan was a middle-sized town with 10.000- 
20.000 inhabitants, mainly Muslim.80 It was both important in terms of strategic and 
economic considerations. Since the Erevan Fortress controlled the Aras Valley, which 
would block any possible advance from Kars, and there were grazing areas around, 
the city had always been a vital factor for armies.81 In addition, the city functioned as 
a trade centre between the Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires.82 However, the 
Russian control of the region gradually culminated in an increase in tariffs, which 
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necessitated the reactivation of the Tabriz-Trabzon trade route for the Persian trade.83 
This damaged the position of Erevan as a major trade link between Persia and Russia, 
and it was not restored until the advent of railway in the region in the 1870’s.84 
Demographically, immigration from the Persian and Ottoman Empires to 
Transcaucasia from 1828 on changed the balance in the favour of Armenians.85 By 
1829, the regions of Erevan and Karabagh welcomed roughly 100.000 Armenian 
immigrants.86 The process of Armenian immigration from the Ottoman Empire to 
Transcaucasia went on throughout the second half of the 19th century and gradually 
became a real factor in the demography of the region.87 
 Thus, by 1870, the extension of railways into Transcaucasia, monetarization of 
economy88 and the impact of Emancipation were more of interest to the majority of 
Armenians, peasants, than the Armenian nationalist revival. Although generally 
stereotyped as an urban type, the population of Armenians in the Russian Empire 
comprised mostly peasants at the time.89 Geographically, these peasants did not have 
the most productive lands so communal ownership and labour were common in the 
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region.90 Like the Russian family, the Armenian family was the primary unit of 
production in the countryside and it could be an extended one or a nucleus family 
depending on the need for communal labor and the agricultural quality of the region.91  
 The implementation of reforms had to wait until 1870 in Transcaucasia. As 
such, the Russian Armenians were trying to adapt to the changes caused by these 
reforms and the transformation of the economy in the region. Of course the main 
problem for the Armenian peasantry was the agrarian one. The emancipation reforms 
did not meet the expectations of land-hungry Armenian peasants who had to work 
hard with the relatively unproductive lands of Erevan.92 The Tsarist regime clearly 
favoured the landlords in the arrangement of Transcaucasian lands in the post 
Emancipation period.93 Thus, the position of state peasants, 86% of Armenian 
peasants, in the region did not change much as they had to pay their obligations to the 
state.94 
The arrangement after the emancipation was more or less the same: unable to 
pay their redemption dues, land hungry peasants were either hired by their landlords 
or paid rents to use the land. In addition to these problems, a further challenge in the 
way of land and economic competition emerged due to Russian sectarian settlement 
into Transcaucasia which was carried out after 1830.95 The competition with 
Armenians for land and business was reflected in the memoirs of sectarians of the 
                                               
90
 Sarkisyanz, 41-42. A useful data to illustrate this point is that territories of the Armenian SSR had 
only 58.2% arable land. Peter Ivanovich Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia: to 
the 1917 Revolution, trans. L. M. Herman (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 621.  
91
 Susie Hoogasian Villa and Mary Kilbourne Matossian, Armenian Village Life Before 1914 (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1982), 22-25. 
92
 Gregorian, 185. 
93
 Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-peasant 
World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1967), 86. 
94
 Robinson, 90. Sarkisyanz, 90. Slavery was not common among Armenians as it did among 
Georgians. A partial explanation lies within the lack of a traditional Armenian nobility. Nicholas B. 
Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia's Empire in the South Caucasus (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 339. 
95
 Breyfogle, 174-176. These sectarian groups in Transcaucasia were mainly Dukhobors, Molokans and 
Subbotniks. 
 26 
region as they described the Armenians as “deft fleecers and exploiters of the simple 
Russian population.”96 
 As usual in the remaining parts of the Empire, perhaps with the exception of 
the enterprising landlords of the Western frontier, the level of agricultural 
development and mechanization were very low among the Armenian peasants. A 
traveler in 1871 observes that in Erevan province corn production and husbandry were 
conducted with very primitive instruments.97 Even worse, poor communication and 
unsanitary conditions caused by the marshes around Erevan countryside made life 
more difficult for the Armenian peasant.98  
Moreover, the peasants also had to deal with bandits, who were very active in 
the Erevan countryside.99 Under these circumstances, some of the Armenian peasants 
might be tempted to immigrate into the major cities of Transcaucasia if their landlord 
sold the land, which was a sensible thing to do considering the decreasing returns of 
agricultural enterprise in the last decades of 19th century. Similar to the general trend 
in the Russian revolutionary parties, many Armenian revolutionaries were recruited 
from the ranks of these immigrants.100  
 Therefore, this low level of prosperity and lack of proper communications 
hindered the extension of national awakening to the Armenian peasantry. The parish 
priest was their only contact for direction in terms of administration, education and 
culture. However, with the expansion of railways into the region, the affairs of 
commerce and agriculture became complicated. In order not to perish, education was 
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the key. Thus, the growth of schooling, printed press and the standardization of 
vernacular made Armenians more aware of their fate. Apart from the educational 
perspective, there was also a political side to this.  
An ordinary Armenian now had more access to the secular Armenian works of 
Abovian, Nalbandian or Raffi (Hagop Melik-Hagobian) and think about the Armenian 
fatherland and the achievements of Armenian heroes. Alternatively, he could read 
descriptions of other Armenian towns in the pages of Mshak, which also promoted 
Russian classics.101 As the Armenian Question became more important after 1878, 
some of those Armenians ventured into the streets of Tiflis and Baku in the hope of 
revolution.   
 
 
3.2. Tiflis  
 
The cosmopolitan aspect of Tiflis by 1870’s struck James Bryce at first sight, 
so far that which he compared the city’s ‘melting pot’ dimension to America’s.102 
Indeed, the composition of the city included Georgians, Persians, Azeris, Armenians 
and even a German dissenter colony from Württemberg.103 Although Tiflis was a 
traditionally Georgian city, the impact of Armenians on Tiflis during the nineteenth 
century was immense.  
Coupled with their skills in commerce, artisanship and given their diaspora 
links, Armenians began to be more influential in the city of Tiflis, while the 
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countryside remained overwhelmingly Georgian.104 The Armenian influence became 
even more intense with the advent of Vorontsov as the viceroy, which signaled a shift 
in the general policy of the Tsarist regime. Rather than trying to impose uniform 
imperial administration system, the elites of the region started to be accommodated, as 
they were recruited into the ranks of Russian bureaucracy and as the State pursued 
more flexible policies. 105 
The Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis benefited from this, especially in 
economic terms. Having acquired the title of pochetnye grazhdane (honoured 
citizens) in Tiflis circa 1850’s, they were exempt from military service and enjoyed 
other privileges.106 The use of Armenians by the Russians as middle-men improved 
their relative position to Georgians and Muslims, which was apparent in the rise of 
Armenian merchants and industrialists. 
While Vorontsov was trying to create his Paris of the Caucasus in 1845, many 
of the smaller Georgian nobles could not catch up with changes in economy and 
match the extravagant spending required to fit with the Russian noble ways.107 Not 
surprisingly, particularly after the emancipation of serfs in 1861, the smaller Georgian 
gentry began to promote hostility to the Russian rule and their Armenian allies in 
Tiflis, which was gradually acquiring an Armenian character.108 On the other hand, 
the inefficient agricultural enterprise forced many Georgian peasants to immigrate 
into Tiflis, where they saw that it was the Armenians who were running the place and 
enjoying several privileges.109 
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This national stratification was also exacerbated by the fact that the owners of 
the factories preferred their fellow country-men as workers for practical linguistic 
purposes, which in the end promoted certain divisions among the population.110 A 
typical example of this process was to be Stalin’s father, who under difficult 
economic circumstances, left Gori to work in an Armenian shoe factory in Tiflis, 
Adelkhanovs’, where traditionally Armenians were preferred as labourers over other 
nationalities.111  
In this nascent antagonism, the differences between the Georgian nobles and 
the Armenian bourgeoisie were becoming more acute as the Tiflis trade considerably 
increased during the second half of the nineteenth century. While the Armenians had 
an important role in Turkish and Persian trade and urban crafts, Georgians, both 
nobles and peasants, were badly hit by the diminishing returns on the agriculture.112 
Thus, according to Suny, the post-emancipation period witnessed an increased 
Georgian migration to Tiflis, where the confrontation with the better-off Armenian, 
who had the control of most of the guilds, trade contracts and the mayor post, paved 
the way for the formation of a certain Georgian national character.113 The economic 
basis was followed by the efforts of the Georgian intelligentsia, with Ilia 
Chavchavadze in the lead, to promote vernacular Georgian, public education and 
national themes.114 
By 1870, the Armenian economic dominance of Tiflis was overwhelming and 
this was bolstered with the advent of railways and telegraph into the region as it 
facilitated the trade between Persia and Russia, which were traditionally in Armenian 
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hands.115 The line between Poti and Tiflis was completed in 1873 and the Baku-Tiflis 
railway was to be completed by 1883, later it reached Kars in 1900. Armenian 
families such as Mantashevs, Avetisians and Arzumanovs were the oil tycoons while 
Tumaniants, Kevorkovs and Pitoevs handled the commerce of the city.116 In addition, 
the establishment of Tiflis Commercial Bank, the Mutual Credit Society and Tiflis 
Gentry Bank between 1871 and 1874 enabled Armenian entrepreneurs to consolidate 
their economic primacy in the city.117 
 Due to their power in the economic sphere, the Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis 
also had a strong say in municipal matters of the city.118 Thus, by 1870’s, the 
Armenians had created a strong presence in economic sphere and a good 
understanding with the Russian rulers, who were happy to use the Armenian 
bourgeoisie of Tiflis as the middle-men in administration and commerce of the region. 
This cordial relation was to be strained by the rise of an Armenian revolutionary 
movement under Russian tutelage, increased hostility from the neighbours and the 





On the verge of the oil boom in the 1870’s, the Armenians of Baku, situated 
near to industrial district of the city had an important role in the economic affairs of 
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the city, though less than Tiflis. As in Tiflis, with their share in the guilds of the city, 
Armenians had an important role in the economy of the city.119 This trend went on 
with the oil boom as many of skilled workers and technicians in the oil sector were of 
Armenian origin.120  
Evidently, these relationships got more complicated with the transformation of 
economy, particularly with the boom of oil industry in Baku. In the period of 1850-
1872, when the Tsarist monopoly on oil production was in force, Armenians such as 
Ter-Gukasov and Mirzoev were the main contractors.121 Then, in 1872 the Tsarist 
government allowed entrepreneurs to conduct large scale oil business by abolishing 
the state monopoly on oil.122 This was good news for foreign entrepreneurs such as 
Nobels and Rothschilds as well as the strong Armenian bourgeoisie of the region to 
increase their scale of production.123  
It was true that the giant foreign companies gradually captured the lion’s share 
but a group of Armenian oil magnets such as Mirzoev and Mantashev appeared as a 
great force as they had the advantage of their local networks.124 For instance, during 
the period of oil boom, Mantashev’s revenues grew such an extent that he could 
arrange the most lavish parties in the city with the most beautiful women from Eastern 
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Europe and Asiatic Russia, dancers and unlimited wine.125 On the other hand, 
Armenians also comprised a good deal of Baku’s labor force. Along with the 
Armenians of Baku guberniia, Armenian immigrants from Karabagh were an 
influential part.126  
While the Armenians were primarily playing the role of middle-men in the 
markets of Tiflis and Baku, the Muslim (Azeri) element was in a complicated 
situation.127 After the annexation of the region by the Russian Empire, the rights of 
Muslim landlords of Transcaucasia, who were seen as allies by the Tsarist regime, 
were retained, though they were not equal in rank with the Russian nobility.128 
However, as the oil business began to develop, the differences between the Muslims 
and the Armenians sharpened. Although, there were some Azeri oil men and some 
other industrialists, their relative share was smaller compared with Armenians.129 As 
for the laborers, Muslims comprised the bulk of the unskilled work force. Similar to 
the situation in Tiflis, industrialists of each nationality preferred their fellow men as 
labourers, which further breed intra-nationality hostilities. 130 
Although the introduction of municipal self-government into Baku in 1878 
seemed to be a promising development for the Muslims, the Muslim franchise was 
restricted to 50 % irrespective of the demographic indicators.131 Hence, the critical 
Armenian influence in the gorodskaia duma (city council) of Baku becomes more 
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significant, especially given the Muslim demographic dominance in the city.132 Thus, 
the affairs of Baku rested on giant foreign oil-companies, Russian bureaucracy and 
the Armenian bourgeoisie of the city, which gradually paved the way for a reaction 
among the Azeris in the way of increased national consciousness. This development 
naturally had a strong anti-Armenian character and affected the Tsarist policies vis-à-
vis Armenians in the years to come.  
The general factors that helped the formation of an Armenian national 
awakening inevitably affected the fate of Muslims. The introduction of telegraph lines 
in 1860’s and the Baku-Tiflis-Batum railway line increased communication 
facilities.133 The general expansion of public schooling and the differences between 
the Azeris and their neighbours in terms of national identity and economic prosperity 
forced preeminent Azeri think about what needs to be done. Thus, the establishment 
of first Azeri newspaper, Ekinci, in 1875 and the efforts of eminent Azeri 
industrialists in cultural affairs were surely an indication of this.134 Coupled with the 
general developments among the Muslims of the Russian Empire such as the 
influence of Ismail Bey Gaspıralı on the modernization of language and Muslim 
schooling or the intellectual efforts of Kazan Tatars, the basis for an Azeri national 
movement was founded.135 
Nevertheless, the formation of an Azeri national consciousness lagged behind 
the Armenians. In addition to their weaker economic prospects and low rates of 
schooling, Azeri printed journals were far less than Armenians.136 This uneven growth 
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of national consciousness and the emergence of sharp differences in their role in the 
economy gradually influenced the way in which Armenian nationalist development 
took its shape. As the Armenian bourgeoisie, generally called by travelers as the 
‘Jews of the East’137 were breeding the material and cultural dimension of the 
Armenian national awakening, the virtues of the deed was to be carried out by the 
Armenian revolutionaries, who were learning from their Russian teachers at the time.
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 “Fortresses would be more useful than the convents, arms more useful than 
sacred vases and the smoke of gunpowder more agreeable than incense”.138 This line 
was produced by Raffi, one of the most famous men of letters of a community, which 
was known by their distinct religion and skills in commerce. Although the ferocity in 
these lines was not directed to the Tsarist regime, not until 1903, there was a Russian 
element in this. It was the Russian revolutionary movement, which helped its 
Armenian counterpart transform their nationalist movement into a revolutionary one. 
The integration of the Armenians into the economic, educational and political life of 
the Empire brought them into closer contact with the Russians, whose influence on 
the Armenians became complicated. One of these complexities was obviously 
demonstrated in the rise of a revolutionary movement which accelerated in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. In this period, according to Suny, social mobility and 
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Western affiliation were more intense among the Armenians of Tsarist Russia than it 
was in the Ottoman Empire.139 As the literary and educational preparation phase of 
the Armenian national awakening got under way, general developments regarding 
reforms and modernization in Tsarist Russia made Armenians more open to radical 
ideas in this period.140  
At the ideological level, the ideas of the Russian intelligentsia such as Sergei 
G. Nechaev, Pyotr L. Lavrov and Pyotr N. Tkachev made a considerable impact on 
the foundations of Armenian revolutionary thinking towards the end of this century. 
The Russian legacy had also its mark on the practical level: Khozhdenie v narod 
(Going to the People) movement and the methods adopted by Narodnaia Volia (The 
People’s Will) provided a valuable guidance for the Armenian radicals.141 Thus, it is 
worth explaining the Russian legacy over the Armenian revolutionary movement by 
focusing on the ideological and operational level. 
 
 
4. 1. The First Classes of Russian Tutelage 
 
In the first place, it is worth thinking on the position of Armenians under the 
Russian rule. From 1828 onwards, Transcaucasia had been integrated into the 
administrative and economic structure of the Empire. The breach of capitalism into 
the Russian Empire got pace with the second half of the nineteenth century as the 
markets of Tiflis and Erevan were flooded with Russian manufactured goods, while 
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raw materials of the region were sent to Moscow and St. Petersburg.142 The case of 
Baku was even more complicated as the oil industry boomed, which totally changed 
the picture of the city. There was also a demographical dimension to a degree in 
which the population of Baku increased tenfold, Tiflis threefold and Erevan twofold 
between 1865 and 1897.143 Therefore, increased urbanization levels brought about 
social changes in centers such as Tiflis, Baku and Batum. In the eyes of the Russians, 
hence, “the period roughly between 1840 and 1880 witnessed the image of the 
Armenians shifting from a fellow Christian to a merchant type.” 144 
 The economic and political integration of the Armenians into the Empire was 
naturally followed at educational and cultural level. Increased number of universities 
and gimnaziias, which was indeed a critical aspect of Russian revolutionary 
movement, naturally affected the Armenian youth. Although the backbone of the 
Armenian education network was controlled by the Armenian Church via parish 
schools, many Armenians who were enrolled into Russian schools to benefit from the 
Tsarist regime. Soon they found themselves affected by a relatively secularized 
system, which in the end had a role in the emergence of Armenian intelligentsia full 
of ideas concerning social change, anti-secularism and national liberation.145   
Another obvious reason for rising Armenian affiliation with the Russian 
radicals was the fact that there was no university in Transcaucasia. Therefore, parallel 
to the rise of the Armenian bourgeoisie in the region, a considerable number of 
Armenian youth found their ways to Russian and European universities. In no time, 
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the universities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Dorpat and Berlin had their Armenian 
students.146  
 Russian universities welcomed the sons and even the daughters of the lower 
classes, who comprised a vital proportion of not only the intelligentsia but also many 
important bureaucratic positions, more than its European counterparts.147 These future 
members of the Russian intelligentsia were in total opposition to the Tsarist regime as 
they contemplated on the injustices of serfdom, the ideal patterns of governance, and 
most importantly the responsibility to act to correct these.148 These ideas also affected 
the students from borderlands, including Armenians, particularly via zemliachestvos, 
where students from the same provinces gathered and discussed the ideas of the 
time.149 
 One such an example was Mikayel Nalbandian. Educated in the universities of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, he became interested in European radicals as well as 
Russians as he went abroad. Thus, his close connections with Herzen and Bakunin 
enabled him to be a part of Zemlia i Volia (Land and Liberty), which urged him to 
write on social and national liberation for Armenians.150 He wrote that “all people 
should preserve their national features freely, which would only give strength and 
soul to the common toil of the peoples.”151 
 The immediate influence of these Russian radical circles was reflected in 
Nalbandian’s works and his journal, where he severely questioned the benefits of the 
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Russian imperial rule.152 Similar to the Russian populist literature, he criticized the 
system of serfdom and the exploitation of the Armenian peasant.153 Later in 1862, he 
was caught by the Russian secret police due to possession of illegal literature and 
causing anti-Tsarist sentiments among the Russian Armenians. He died just after he 
was released from the jail in 1866, causing further skepticism about the benefits of 
Russian imperial rule among his fellow Armenian radicals.154  
As Szamuely notes, an important ideological legacy of the Russian 
revolutionary movement for other variants was its creation of the cult of 
‘revolutionism’, for which the revolutionary fighter could sacrifice himself and the 
idealization of the revolutionary hero.155 Themes such as martyrdom, self-sacrifice or 
suffering were used widely in the Russian revolutionary circles.156  
These ideas were not limited to the discussions of Russian radicals; they began 
to disseminate with the publication of novels such as Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky’s 
What Is To Be Done. This pattern of Russian revolutionaries would be an important 
guide for the ideological preparation phase of their Armenian counterparts. 
Particularly, Armenians educated in Russian universities were influenced by this 
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4.2. The Imprint of Russian Populism on the Armenian Revolutionaries 
 
The formation of the Armenian revolutionary movement, especially at the 
ideological level, was heavily influenced by Russian populist movement throughout 
1870’s and 1880’s.158 One of the important influences in this sense stemmed from 
Nechaev’s ideas on the mentality of revolutionary movement in the Empire. Having 
defined the ideal type of a revolutionary, he set the framework in which the future 
revolutionary organizations should operate. “Those who join the organization must 
give up every possession, occupation or family tie, because families and occupations 
might distract the members from their activities.”159 Other than the traits of the ideal 
revolutionary, Nechaev also wrote on the categorization of the enemies and the 
methods to deal with them.160 His ideas were to be put into practice later by Armenian 
revolutionaries, who murdered non-collaborators in several places, including a major 
one in a church in Moscow.161  
Back from the days of the Decembrists, the Russian revolutionary tradition 
had been full of themes of sacrifice, messianism and revolutionary responsibility.162 
According to this tradition, the Russian revolutionary had a special role to save people 
and country and would do his task whatever the costs. These themes of absolute 
devotion and self-sacrifice for the ultimate cause had a profound imprint on the 
Armenian revolutionaries in the years to come. An evident example of Armenian 
revolutionaries’ embracing such ideals occurred with the Gugunian Expedition of 
1890.  
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A small armed unit of Armenian volunteers led by Sarkis Gugunian, who was 
educated in St. Petersburg, began their campaign to help the Armenians on the other 
side of the border. Yet, the insufficient means of the party and their unrealistic 
objective brought a debacle, in which most of them were killed by Ottoman forces 
while the ones who could make it to the Russian border were immediately arrested by 
the Tsarist police.163 Therefore, the Nechaev spirit had found an embodiment with the 
self-sacrificial attitude of these revolutionaries of the Gugunian Expedition. Likewise, 
the Dashnaks, depicted their revolutionaries as the Archangel Gabriel, who was to 
execute ‘the will of on high’.164 
 As the Russian reform process came to a standstill and the pressure on the 
revolutionaries increased after the Polish uprising and the unsuccessful assassination 
attempt on the Tsar by Dmitrii V. Karakozov in 1866, there was a moment of change 
in the Russian revolutionary movement, which in turn, affected the mentality of the 
Armenian revolutionary movement. With the influence of Lavrov’s teachings, a 
daring campaign of ‘Going to the People’ was initiated between 1874 and 1877 in 
order to educate the peasantry as the basic sources of revolution. Lavrov believed that 
“the revolution should be made not only for the people but also by the people.”165 
Although the lack of immediate results in countryside and harsh police measures on 
these idealists were the signals for disappointment, the idea had deeply affected the 
Armenians. It is also important to note that the idealization of the Russian peasant by 
Russian populists played a vital role in the development of national consciousness 
among other nationalities of the Empire. As Pipes asserts, “increased interests of the 
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customs of the peasants, their customs, language accelerated national awakening of 
various peoples”, also Armenians.166 
Modeled on the idea of ‘Improve yourselves and then improve your people’ of 
Lavrov, Armenian revolutionaries launched the movement of Depi Yerkir (To the 
Fatherland). The rationale of this drive was to call the Armenian intelligentsia, 
professionals and students into the revolutionary struggle to pay their ‘debts to the 
people’.167 These educated and better-off Russian Armenians were urged to go to the 
fatherland, to “Ottoman Armenia”, where the Armenian peasant needed the help of 
their Armenian brethren.168 The logic of their channeling all energies to “Ottoman 
Armenia”, instead of Russian proper; basically stemmed from their argument that the 
Ottoman Armenians were far worse than the ones in the Russian Empire.169 This 
campaign was also supported by the writings of nationalist Armenian writers, most 
prominent of them being Raffi. In his work, Kaytzer (Sparks), he depicted Armenian 
students from Russia going to “Ottoman Armenia” to observe their brethrens’ 
condition.170 
Hence, the responsibilities of these urban Armenians were not only to aid 
Armenian peasantry in economic terms but also to stimulate their national identity, of 
which they were largely unaware at the time. One can not fail to notice the similarity 
between ‘Going to the People’ movement of Russian populists in 1870’s and ‘To the 
Fatherland’ campaign of Armenians.171 Both attempts aimed to educate and make 
conscious peasants for a change, with slight shift of the emphasis on a national 
                                               
166
 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, rev. 
ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Pr., 1964), 8. 
167
 Minassian, “Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887-1912)”, 
156. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, 67. 
168
 Nalbandian, 136-137. 
169
 Walker, 62. 
170
 Bardakjian, 146. 
171
 Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, 67. 
 43 
revolution rather than a social one. Moreover, participants of both Russian and 
Armenian versions of the movement turned to violence as their peaceful methods 
failed to realize their goals. 
With the failure of ‘Going to the People’ campaign, the Russian populists 
decided to act more firmly as revolutionary parties generally do when they fail. The 
level of intimidation was not limited to Tsarist officials. For instance, Rostov section 
of Land and Liberty put up several posters in which were lines such as “Such is the 
fate that awaits every Judas”, to threaten traitors to the party.172 It is interesting to note 
that in first issues of Droshak (The Banner), Dashnaks’ official journal, there were 
very similar threats to the betrayers to the cause.173  
 
 
4.3. The People’s Will and Its Legacy 
 
In effect, increased police repression, mass arrests and political trials of 
populists led the members of Land and Liberty to think about restructuring.174 
However, there was disagreement over the tactics and the organization split into two 
groups in the summer of 1879. Those advocating a policy of terror established the 
People’s Will, while others, emphasizing agitation and propaganda among the people, 
and formed Chernyi Peredel (The Black Partition). The leading ideologue of the 
latter, Georgii V. Plekhanov argued that “terror would produce another sort of 
domination of the will and the needs of the majority by a minority and instead, 
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advocated intense propaganda and education.”175 Still, Plekhanov did not rule out the 
fact that terrorism might help to damage the Tsarist machine but the excessive 
emphasis on terrorism put by the People’s Will was tactically wrong.176 
  In that respect, the Armenian revolutionary movement had definitely preferred 
the tactics of the People’s Will people not only due to their reliance on terror but also 
the party structure as well. “The People’s Will, the structure of which had been a 
source of inspiration for all subsequent organizations of this sort, was formulated as a 
hierarchical, centralized body, in which the Executive Committee was responsible for 
the decision making process and designing party policies.”177 The number of members 
of the organization, who served in this Executive Committee, was fewer than fifty.178 
The party favoured small detachments over mass membership so as to fight more 
efficiently and avoid arrests. As such, it is estimated that total membership to the 
party never exceeded 500.179 
Their choice might have been based on their emphasis on the discipline and 
secrecy within the party at the expense of the active support of the masses. This 
vanguard party characteristic, also an important aspect of the Bolsheviks, was a main 
feature of both Hinchaks and Dashnaks, at least until the Tsarist decision to confiscate 
the Armenian Church in 1903. One can easily observe the vanguard party type of 
Hinchaks and Dashnaks as figures for their membership numbers were very low until 
1903.180  
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 The myth of the people and the revolutionaries’ responsibility to act for them 
was a Russian revolutionary tradition. For many revolutionary ideologues, “the 
Russian intelligentsia was the main actor in the making of history in the name of the 
people”.181 In that respect, Tkachev’s ideas on the importance of the vanguard party 
might have influenced the Armenian revolutionary movement. According to Tkachev, 
“the people were already ready for the revolution, but did not know it, so that the 
initiative should be maintained by professional revolutionaries”.182 It was the 
responsibility of the revolutionary to reach the masses, which was more or less the 
case in the Armenian context as the peasants of both Russian and Ottoman Empire 
were not that interested in revolutionary politics in general. 
 
 
4.4. The Learning Curve: The Armenian Revolutionaries in Action   
 
Of course, the core of Armenian revolutionary movement was Tiflis. This had 
to do with the cultural development of the city, a part of which was Armenian money. 
The establishment of an Armenian theater in late 1860’s, where national themes were 
performed and the expansion of bookstores in the city (5th in the whole Empire in 
1890) surely helped the development of Armenian revolutionary movement.183 A 
young Armenian immigrant, a son of an artisan or a seminarian in Tiflis could access 
to Raffi’s works, which portrayed the social injustice in the city and the 
                                               
181
 Szamuely, 208. 
182
 Venturi, 413- 414. Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: the Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (New 
York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1998), 137. 
183
 Bardakjian, 104, Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature 
1861-1917 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 110. The increasing number of 
bookstores also enabled the circulation of thick journals, which had a considerable number of readers. 
These journals provided a space for ideological discussions, from which many revolutionary 
theoreticians benefited. Szamuely, 194-195. 
 46 
revolutionaries’ role to assume the burden.184 This could have been further 
strengthened with the general immigrant psychology, in which “the lack of his roots 
in the city was compensated with the party comradeship.”185 Naturally, all of these 
populist revolutionary organizations had their local branches in Tiflis, the hotbed of 
Armenian radicalism, which taught Armenians various revolutionary methods. For 
instance, the Executive Committee of the People’s Will in the Tiflis branch had three 
Armenian and three Georgian members.186  
However, as the organization gradually disintegrated after the assassination of 
the Tsar in 1881, the affiliated Armenians began to form their own organizations 
based on the model of their Russian counterparts. One of those groups was Moscow 
based Hayrenaserneri Muitiun (The Union of Patriots), which made use of illegal 
press and advocated socio-economic liberation of the Armenians.187 For their 
operational scheme, the tactics of propaganda, agitation and most importantly, armed 
resistance were adopted.188 Later, this group published Azadutian Avedaper 
(Messenger of Freedom) circa 1883-4, which contributed to the national revolutionary 
movement.189 Meanwhile, several small revolutionary cells were founded in Tiflis and 
Erevan and began to distribute revolutionary literature and tried to assist the 
revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire, their main area of focus.190 
 The next critical phase for the Armenian revolutionaries began in 1887 with 
the foundation of Hinchak Revolutionary Party in Geneva. The Russian legacy was 
more than obvious. Even the name of the party was a tribute to Herzen’s journal 
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Kolokol.191 Unsurprisingly, all of the founding members of the organization192 were 
educated in Russian universities, where they familiarized themselves with the Russian 
revolutionaries. The leader of the party, Avetis Nazarbekian and his fiancée, Maro 
Vardanian had certain connections with the Russian revolutionary parties.193 As they 
left Russia for Europe, the future leader cadres of Hinchaks had been in close touch 
with influential Russian émigrés in Geneva including Plekhanov and Vera I. 
Zasulich.194  
 The Russian influence could be also observed at the organizational level. 
Similar to the strategy and highly centralized structure of the People’s Will, Hinchaks 
adopted a program, which included extensive clandestine operations and propaganda 
until the tyranny had been destroyed.195 As in the Russian tradition, terror would be a 
tool to awaken the passive masses.196 Moreover, the emphasis of Russian populists on 
the potential role of Russian peasantry for a social change was shared by these 
Armenian revolutionaries.197 Yet, the tyrant that Hinchaks aimed to topple was the 
Ottoman not the Russian one. 
According to the Hinchak scheme, only after the Ottoman Armenians had 
been saved, could a federal democratic republic come about, consisting of Russian, 
Persian and Ottoman Armenians.198 Although using Marxist rhetoric, Somakian 
argues, Hinchaks still had a nationalist character, which by looking the examples of 
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Greek and Bulgarian counterparts, was useful in attaining autonomy.199 Still, their 
impact was limited. One of the causes of their ineffectiveness was the lack of appeal 
of their socialist leanings both among some party members and possible cooperative 
elements, such as the Great Powers and the Armenian bourgeoisie.200 After their 
participation to Zeitun uprising in 1895, Hinchaks lost their eminence in the 
Armenian revolutionary movement, which was to be taken over by another group. 
This party was Dashnaksutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), which 
emerged as an association of several Armenian revolutionary groups. The party was 
founded in Tiflis in 1890 by Russian Armenians and its main aim was to liberate 
“Ottoman Armenia”, while the methods of the party, again, had much in common 
with the People’s Will.201 All of the members of the leader cadre, Kristapor 
Mikayelian202, Stepan Zorian and Simon Zavarian were educated in Russian 
universities. As their Russian predecessors, Dashnaks used various forms of tactics 
including armed rebellions, assassinations, propaganda and agitation.203 For that 
purpose, an armory was built in Tabriz in 1891.204 
 Moreover, the programme of the party had been clearly influenced by the 
manifesto of the People’s Will. Rather than the Marxist rhetoric, which Hinchaks 
employed to a certain extent, the tone of the Dashnaks resembled mostly the populist 
doctrine, stressing the importance of the peasantry for the future society. 205 In effect, 
the core programmes of both parties aimed at destroying the tyrant by whatever 
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means necessary and used populist terms to get the attraction of masses. In line with 
the People’s Will, the reliance on terrorist acts was accepted as legitimate by the 
Dashnaks in the sense that “terror was a necessity where collective action was 
missing.”206  
In that aspect, Dashnaks were luckier than their Russian teachers as they could 
appeal to the rising nationalist sentiment among Armenians whereas the Russian 
peasants mourned the murder of their Tsar in 1881, certainly not a sign of 
appreciation of what the members of the People’s Will tried to achieve. Similar to 
Hinchaks, the Dashnaks aimed to liberate “Turkish Armenia”, and there was no direct 
address to the needs of Russian Armenians.207 
To sum up, the impact of Russian radicalism in the second half of the 
nineteenth century made a profound impact on the development of the nascent 
Armenian revolutionary movement in the way of mentality, structure and the methods 
employed. Beginning from the radical ideas regarding the revolutionary cause of 
Nechaev, themes of self-sacrifice and utter devotion to the cause entered into the 
vocabulary of Armenian radicalism as it was carried out in the Gugunian Expedition 
in 1890. Being another important revolutionary ideologue, Lavrov’s contribution to 
the Armenian revolutionary thinking had been exercised in the ‘To the Fatherland’ 
movement. In order to enlighten and help the Armenian peasantry, that campaign 
urged several urban Armenians in the Russian Empire to go to their fatherland, 
“Ottoman Armenia”.  
Nevertheless, the most striking influence of the Russian revolutionaries on 
their Armenian successors was the practical methods they adopted. In that respect, the 
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methods of the People’s Will had been borrowed by various Armenian revolutionary 
groups. By legitimizing the use of intensive terror, propaganda and agitation for 
achieving the ultimate cause of eliminating the grand tyrant, the Tsar, the People’s 
Will had been a perfect example for the Armenian cause, which considered the 
Ottoman rule as a tyranny for the time being. Furthermore, both Dashnaks and 
Hinchaks adopted a similar organizational structure to the People’s Will in the sense 
that they operated as vanguard parties with certain restrictions on the membership 
qualifications due to reasons of discipline and the risks of having a wider base. With 
this learning process, the pupils of the Russian radicalism would shake the bars of this 









While formulating their initial strategies, the Dashnak leaders assumed that 
“Russia would welcome their activities due to her historic enmity with the 
Ottomans.”208 The last two decades of 19th century showed that they were somehow 
mistaken in their calculations. With the coronation of Alexander III as the new Tsar in 
1881, virtually all nationalities suffered from severe limitations in the way of political 
and cultural matters due to Russification policies; and Armenians were no exception. 
However, problems got worse as Armenian revolutionary parties went into action. 
Although these parties refrained from acting in the Russian Empire, they contributed 
to the change of their perception by the Tsarist regime as potential trouble makers.209  
 The Russian response to the Armenians massacres of 1894-96 in the Ottoman 
Empire was also in line with her domestic policies as regards to the Armenians. 
Owing to the changes of priorities in her foreign policy, there was a certain 
understanding with the Ottoman Empire. Armenian cries for Russian intervention 
found no reply but instead more repression. The limitations on Armenian schooling 
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regulations increased, interestingly by the order of the minister of Education, Ivan D. 
Delianov, an Armenian himself. 
Meanwhile, relations with the Armenians’ fellow-Caucasians were no better. 
Noe Zhordania was talking of “a Georgian take-over of Tiflis from the ‘alien culture 
of Armenians’.”210 Ethnic antagonisms were also exacerbated by the competition for 
jobs, especially in a period of population boom.211 These were indeed difficult times 
for Russian Armenians especially given the hostile attitude of the Tsarist 
administration, which was evident in Prince Grigorii S. Golitsyn’s outburst: “The only 




5.1. The Russian Perception of Armenians in the Late 19th Century 
 
The Russian perception of Armenians began to shift. As Suny puts it, they 
were increasingly seen, not so much as mercantile fellow-Christians but as rebellious 
and disloyal, a process starting in the early 1880’s and continuing up to the first 
decade of the 20th century.213 Nevertheless, this needs further elaboration. In this 
aspect, the relations of Armenians with other nationalities of Transcaucasia and the 
doubts of the Tsarist administration regarding the revolutionary activities of 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were influential.214 In the first place, it would be 
useful to analyze the dimension of interrelations between Armenians, Georgians and 
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Muslims of Transcaucasia as regards this growing anti-Armenian perception by 
Tsarist authorities.  
In the second half of 19th century, the position of the Armenians in 
Transcaucasia vis-à-vis Georgians and Muslims gradually improved. The prestigious 
position of Loris-Melikov as the Minister of Interior certainly raised the Armenian 
expectations.215 Moreover, demographic, economic and political factors were on the 
side of Russian Armenians at the time.  
Particularly in Tiflis and Baku, Armenians dominated industry and trade. A 
British traveler, Lynch, on a visit to Transcaucasia in 1894, saw the Armenians as the 
major productive force as builders, wine producers or public servants.216 By 1900, 
4206 of 7929 commercial houses in Tiflis, 44% of the largest industrial firms were 
Armenian owned.217 As a sign of their domination of economy in the city, goods 
coming from Tiflis to Russian cities were called armianskie tovary (Armenian 
goods).218 As for Baku, the Armenian share in the oil industry reached as much as 
30% and most shares of Transcaucasian Banks were owned by Armenian 
businessmen.219 In Batum, where shipment of oil was important, Armenians 
controlled 25% of the shipping industry.220 
Another important factor was the increased strategic importance of the region 
and the rising Russian interest in Eastern Anatolia. Following the 1877-78 War, 
Russia opened four military vice-consulates in Rize, Erzurum, Van and Hami to 
monitor the developments, especially among the Armenians and Kurds, for the 
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Asiatic Department.221 The activities of Armenians were not only important for 
foreign policy; Russia had to think of her own Armenians, who were getting ready 
with increased national consciousness and the influence of Russian radicalism. The 
Russian authorities were right to be concerned as the Armenian revolutionary cells 
began to spread in the Russian Empire, especially in the borderlands to assist their 
fellows across the border. In the next decade, the Kars and Erevan committees of the 
Dashnaks would play a key role in the training of revolutionaries, especially in the 
way of smuggling arms.222 
On the other hand, the Georgian and Muslim nobility of the region were 
impoverished due to their lack of compatibility with the new economic conditions. 
The contrast with the Armenians was considerable. Not only had they a substantial 
Diaspora heritage; the fact that they had experienced a national awakening earlier than 
their neighbours gave a certain advantage as far as the formation of a middle class 
was concerned.223 The completion of Tiflis-Baku railway line in 1883 further fuelled 
the economic transformation of the region. As a result, vanishing feudal ties forced 
Georgian and Muslim peasants and their landlords to change and head for cities where 
they came across the economically adept Armenians.224 
During the 1880’s, this negative Armenian image was also shared by the top 
Tsarist officials of the region. Prince Alexander M. Dondukov-Korsakov (a veteran of 
the Crimean and 77-78 Wars), the High Commissioner of the Caucasus225  between 
1882 and 1890, complained about the Armenians’ economic domination at the 
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expense of their neighbours in his correspondence to the Tsar.226 The complaints of 
Dondukov-Korsakov were not restricted to economic; he also wrote that “the secular 
Armenian intelligentsia, who had ‘dreams of a future independent existence for 
Armenia’, was the most politically problematic element of the region.”227 
By 1897, 47% of Tiflis population was Armenian, which meant that in 
municipal affairs under the existing franchise, there was an Armenian majority of the 
seats in the Tiflis city council.228 However, the proportion of Armenians in Tiflis was 
going down mainly due to the rise of the Georgian and Russian populations in the 
city, and the Armenian share declined to 38%, a plurality.229 Nevertheless, due to their 
high urbanization rates and merchant base, the Armenian dominance of the economy 
still held.  
These developments formed a major anti-Armenian sentiment among 
Georgians, which was soon to be shared by the Russian officials headed by Golitsyn, 
the successor to Dondukov-Korsakov, who first took the Armenian-dominated Tiflis 
council to court for corruption and then carried out the confiscation of the Armenian 
Church.230 In Baku, apart from dominating the oil industry and high finance, 
Armenians also formed the majority of the skilled labor force, which was a source of 
bitterness for the Muslims, who were mostly unskilled laborers.231  
Therefore, reaction against the Armenians was in the air as they were better-
off economically and dispersed in the region. This economic perspective caused the 
Russians to conclude that the Armenians were complicating their relations with the 
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Georgians and Muslims, and this is perhaps one reason for their harsher treatment of 
Armenians in the Russification process. 
 
 
5.2. The Impact of Russification on the Armenians 
 
One of the major challenges to the Russian Empire always involved the issue 
of nationalities. The rapid territorial expansion of the empire absorbed a variety of 
peoples, each of which proved different problems. The Tsarist regime, Pipes argues, 
never formulated a consistent policy towards these peoples; instead it used eclectic 
methods depending on the location, religious differences or the level of national 
consciousness.232 Keeping the principle of autocracy intact, Tsarist nationalities 
policy allowed these people to keep their cultural and religious rights if they proved to 
be useful for the interests of the Empire. 
Suny asserts that the term Russification could also mean the previous attempts 
of administrative standardization by Catherine II and Nicholas I or the nationalities’ 
self- adaptation process to the Russian rule.233 Proponents of this approach, like Baron 
Pavel I. Hahn in 1840’s, even hinted on linguistic assimilation of Georgians and 
Armenians to prevent ‘dreams of false nationalisms’, though this project did not 
materialize.234 However, the later Russification drive of Alexander III proved to be 
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the more systematic than any other attempt to curb the national and religious 
freedoms of the minorities of the Empire.235  
Another factor that determined the relationship between the Russian center 
and the Armenian periphery was the difference of religion, the principle distinctive 
feature in effect in Tsarist Russia at least until 1905. During the second half of 19th 
century, many Russian officials believed that the strengthening of Orthodoxy; 
whether by Russian colonization or conversion was the surest way to Russify the 
borderlands.236 This sort of aggressive Russification also affected Transcaucasia since 
it increased Russian settlement in the region and increased the pressure on the 
national churches of Armenia and Georgia. Despite this sort of pressure was less 
effective than the cultural and administrative one, it was displaying the imperial 
mentality towards religious differences. Thus, “either cultural or religious pressure 
was the driving features of this Russification wave in the quest to create a sense of 
belonging to the Empire.”237 
Still, the degree to which the Tsarist regime responded also had to do with 
demographic and economic realities. As Starr notices, the population increase in the 
borderlands and their rising economic importance and consequent intellectual 
flourishing alerted St. Petersburg.238 As the census of 1897 demonstrated, the 
population of Transcaucasia had a high fertility rate; especially the youth population 
was rapidly rising.239 In the whole Russian Empire, Transcaucasia had the lowest 
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average age, which provided revolutionary parties many recruits.240 The fertility rates 
of Armenians and Azeris were above those of Georgians and the Russians.241 
Given these realities, the Armenian image in Russian eyes deteriorated and 
this became obvious with the Russification campaign of Alexander III (1881-1894), 
which followed the advice of the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin P. 
Pobedonostsev. The assassination of Alexander II marked a change of direction of the 
Russian policy towards nationalities- notoriously a matter affecting the Jews. The 
main rationale of this change was to increase the degree of administrative 
centralization by abolishing local privileges, which in the end affected the fate of 
Armenians in the Tsarist Russia negatively.242 As a part of this policy, the post of 
viceroy was abolished in 1882 to increase the control of the center. Apart from the 
conservative tendencies during the reign of Alexander III, demographic realities 
might have alarmed Russian authorities as the Russians became a minority in their 
own empire. By 1897, non-Russian people comprised 55.7 % of the population, as a 
threat to ‘one and indivisible rhetoric of the imperial tradition’, which was an 
important motivation for the Russification policy.243  
In the process of their integration to the Russian Empire, the Armenians of 
Tsarist Russia voluntarily adapted themselves to the imperial structure. However, the 
Russification drive in the last two decades of the century was certainly not voluntary, 
nor was it an agreeable business for the Armenians. In this period, the initial phase of 
the campaign basically aimed at an increased centralization of administration and 
legal structures. Nevertheless, the decisive effect of Russification on the Armenians 
was carried out in the way of culture and education. In general, this aspect brought 
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about an intensification of Russian language, history and culture in the curriculums 
accompanied by pressure against the use of local languages in the education.  
The Armenian case proved to be different in line with their worsening image 
in the Russian eyes. The Russian government decided to close down Armenian 
parochial schools in 1885. Although the decree was partially abrogated in 1886, it 
took effect in a more strict way a decade later. A famous Armenian publicist, E. 
Aknouni (Khachatur Malumian) recalls that Tsarist police arrests, house searches 
were common in Erevan during 1884-5 and many Armenians were either sent to 
prison or to Siberian exile.244 Particularly, activist Armenians including Grigor 
Artsruni and Raffi were interrogated by the Tsarist police.245 
Russian instruction in gimnaziias and even seminaries was intensified to such 
a degree that every Armenian teacher was required to pass a Russian language 
examination.246 A British observer in Tiflis, Hardinge, also noted that compulsory 
universal military service was introduced in 1887, with all of its implications for the 
Armenians. According to him, although educated Armenians and the intelligentsia 
thought that military service would help the nation train itself, ordinary Armenians 
found it vexatious and this was shown in several riots: “Why should we fight for a 
country which is not ours?” 247 
By 1892, these misfortunes of Russian Armenians in this period also brought 
about a change in the image of Russia as a benevolent patron. In a private 
conversation with a British official, Minas Cheraz, (also a member of the Armenian 
delegate at the Berlin Congress) the editor of L’Armenie, claimed that “Russian 
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patronage was not preferable as Russia would oppress the Armenian people if she 
annexed the whole region.”248 He cited the conversion of an Armenian Church into a 
Russian Orthodox one in Kars in 1878 as an example, and indeed the oldest Armenian 
Church, that of the twelve apostles, was turned over for the use of the garrison.249 
In January 1896, as some diaspora Armenians were petitioned for British 
backing about the Armenian massacres, the Tsarist officials informed them that all 
Armenian parish schools would be shut down, which was indeed to be carried out 
very harshly.250 In addition, the pressure on Armenians by Tsarist censors escalated, 
which saw the prohibition of using words ‘Armenian nation’ in publications by 
1898.251 Far from curbing radicalism, this policy increased nationalist sentiments 
among Armenians as the pamphlets written by the future leader of Dashnaksutiun, 
Kristapor Mikayelian demonstrates: “Our schools are being closed with the help of 
bayonets, so let each Armenian family become a school and let that Armenian who 
meets another Armenian and does not speak to him in Armenian be cursed.”252   
 The Russification campaign also brought about an increased colonization of 
Transcaucasia by Russian settlers. For Russian conservatives, the permanent solution 
to the problems of Transcaucasia, settled by nationally conscious peoples, would be 
settling more Russians in the region, which would strengthen the imperial rule.253 
Golitsyn also favoured the sending away the immigrant Ottoman Armenians who had 
fled after the 1894-96 massacres, as this would be in the Tsarist interest, by creating 
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space for Russian colonists.254 In this sense, Borian thinks that Russification drive had 
also an economic rationale; the confiscation and other difficulties would pave the way 
for securing sources to support Russian colonists in the area.255 
For the purpose of Russifying the region biologically, the settlement of 
sectarians in Transcaucasia went on after the 1877-78 War.256 Although this project 
lost pace as demonstrated by the 5 % of Russian population in whole Transcaucasia 
by 1897, it still gives a clue about the doubts about the problems that might have been 
created by the national movements in the region.257 
This policy also necessitated taking away the lands of impoverished Georgian 
and Muslim landlords and transferring them to Russian colonists. This was to be 
carried out via the establishment of a Land Bank of Caucasus, which would prevent 
Armenians, who owned most of capital in the region, from taking over the lands.258 
There were also limitations on the number of Armenians admitted into the 
bureaucracy in those times, especially after 1896.259 
There was also a foreign policy perspective at work as regards Tsarist Russia’s 
harsher treatment of Armenians during this drive. The Russian rapprochement with 
the Ottoman Empire evidently necessitated winning over the Muslims of 
Transcaucasia and downplaying the Armenian Question.260 A clear indication of this 
is the change of the city council election regulations, which had been based on a one-
third non-Christian quota. In Baku, this law was modified favorably to Muslims in 
1900, most probably as a part of the Tsarist anti-Armenian campaign.261 
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5.3. Armenian Dreams Shattered: The Russian Foreign Policy Dimension 
 
Armenians had to wait until 1878 to be included in an international document 
in modern history.262 Consequent San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress were 
very influential in the fate of both Ottoman and Russian Armenians. The Russian 
victory in the 1877-78 war encouraged the Armenians to such extent that Patriarch 
Nerses told the British ambassador Layard that “if Great Powers failed to create an 
autonomous Armenia, then they would immigrate to Russia en masse.”263  
Under article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty, the Russian army would be the 
guarantor of the reform process, which would have changed the course of history for 
the Armeno-Russian relations. However, other major powers, despite the lamentations 
of Patriarch Nerses, who showed up in Berlin Congress to win the hearts and minds of 
the Great Powers, blocked the Russian designs. Instead, an interesting substitution, 
article 61 of the Berlin Congress stated that the reform process would be monitored by 
an international commission.264   
In general, post-Crimean Russian foreign policy had been a careful one due to 
the poor position of the Empire vis-à-vis her rivals both economically and 
militarily.265 In order to reverse this with a rapid drive for modernization, a status-quo 
approach in foreign policy recommended itself easily enough. According to Rogger, it 
was this weakness of the Russian Empire that caused the Tsar not to act firmly over 
the Bulgarian and Afghan crises of the 1880’s and to seek French Alliance in 1894.266 
The change of attitude becomes more obvious if we compare the Loris-Melikov 
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project of an autonomous Armenia circa 1878 under Russian protection (by uniting 
Russian and Ottoman Armenians) and the Russian attitude towards the 1894-96 
events.267  
Another element which affected the changing Russian attitude towards the 
Armenians was the Bulgarian example. Having secured the Bulgarian autonomy after 
the 1877-78 Russo- Ottoman Wars, Russia confronted serious resistance, which she 
saw as treachery, from her protégé. It was of course a great shock for Alexander III to 
see his nephew, Alexander of Battenberg, the Bulgarian Prince, preferring Austria to 
Russia. Although Alexander was forced out by a Russian-backed coup d’état, another 
Austrian-backed German prince, Ferdinand of Coburg was elected as Prince of 
Bulgaria in 1887.  
Here was a small Balkan country, with vital Orthodox and Slavic connections, 
insisting on its independence, at the expense of Russian patronage. Hence, with the 
increased importance of the Armenian cause in international relations, it was sensible 
for Russians to reflect more deeply as to what they were doing, and this was not 
helpful for the Armenians inside Russia. The Russian perspective as to Armenian 
autonomy in the 1890’s was well shown in a remark by the Foreign Minister Nikolai 
K. de Giers: “We do not intend to create a second Bulgaria within our borders”.268  
It followed that in 1890’s; the Russian Empire came to a certain understanding 
with the Ottoman Empire regarding the Armenian Question. Alexander III and 
Abdülhamid II tended to see things in much the same light.269 From the Ottoman 
                                               
267
 Somakian, 10. Robert F. Zeidner, “Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 7, no. 4 (October 1976): 474. 
268
 M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, St Martin's Press, 1970), 
254. Ottoman ambassador to London, Safvet Pasha produced a similar line to his German counterpart 
about the Russian attitude as regards to Armenian reforms that “Russia would not make the same 
mistake as she did in Bulgaria”. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk Đnkilabı Tarihi, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 79.  
269
 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya: XVII.Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına kadar Türk-Rus 
Đlişkileri 1798-1919 (Ankara: Ankara Üniv., 1970), 101.  
 64 
point of view, this was a reasonable policy considering British pressure for the 
Armenian reform project since 1878. Moreover, apart from the increasing importance 
of the Far East in Russian foreign policy designs, another aspect of this shift was 
rooted in the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia.270 These problems in Afghanistan and 
Far East could have been complicated with an autonomous Armenia with British 
support, who in early 1890’s continuously pressed on the Sultan for reforms. This 
must have alerted the Russians since an autonomous Armenia with close ties to 
Britain would be a serious nuisance for Russian designs in the Transcaucasia and the 
Middle East.271 In this sense, the signing of the Cyprus Convention was also an 
important dimension of the Russian policy in Armenian Question as the Russian 
foreign minister, Alexei B. Lobanov-Rostovskii revealed during Tsar Nicholas’ 
coronation ceremony.272 
After the massacres of 1894-96, the Great Powers pressed the Ottoman 
government for reform scheme in Eastern Anatolia. From the beginning of reform 
discussions among the Great Powers, the Russians were not in a hurry as the British 
were. When the French and the British decided to increase pressure on the Sultan by 
presenting an ultimatum in June 1896, Lobanov-Rostovskii firmly refused to be 
associated with it, asserting that “the Russian government would not adopt coercive 
measures or consent to the creation in Asia Minor of a district in which the Armenians 
would have exceptional privileges.”273 Lobanov-Rostovskii added that “a joint 
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intervention by all major powers would give ‘too much encouragement’ to the 
Armenians”, something of which the Russian Government was not in favor.274  
A possible motive for Russian unwillingness for joint action might be related 
to the long-term policy of capturing Istanbul. A joint action for the reforms could also 
lead to an international control of the Straits, which would make it more difficult to 
realize the Russian dream.275 Greece, increasingly close to Great Britain, might even 
be advanced in the Levant. Moreover, it could also mean a total control of Ottoman 
economic resources by the major powers.276 
The attitude of the imperial family was not more promising. The Tsar even 
refused to give an audience to the Catholicos Khrimian, who went there to ask for 
Russian support for intervention in early 1895.277 To make things worse, the Russian 
dowager Empress refused to send money to the Red Cross for charity projects 
regarding the Armenians.278 In general, Somakian argues that this Russian opposition 
to Armenian reforms in “Ottoman Armenia” was based on the Russian suspicion that 
reform talks would spread to Russia and hinder Russification efforts of the Tsarist 
regime.279 
Nevertheless, there were some Russians, who dreamed of capturing Tsargrad 
and the Armenian massacres of 1895-6 gave them a valid excuse. With the approval 
of the British and the death of Lobanov-Rostovskii in late 1896, talk of intervention in 
Russian circles grew, but the weakness of the navy and the fragility of the economy 
prevented such an enterprise.280 Although this war party, mainly consisting of 
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Ambassador Alexander I. Nelidov, the minister of War and the Tsar, emerged after 
the massacres in Istanbul in 1896, Sergei I. Witte and others strictly opposed the plan- 
it was abandoned later.281  
Although revolutionary fears might have played a certain role in Russian 
concerns, there was also the British interest in Armenian Question from 1878 on. For 
the British, main reasons for supporting the reform scheme were basically designed to 
prevent a possible annexation of Eastern Anatolia by the Russians, which would 
endanger British interests in the Suez Canal and eventually in India.282 Layard thought 
that if the Russians captured Armenia, then northern Persia, Central Asia and 
eventually India would be under Russian threat.283 It was the liberator image of Russia 
among the Armenians of border vilayets that bothered the British most so they 
decided to press the Sultan in order to win the hearts of the Armenians.284 
Nevertheless, British efforts were in vain as they found a unilateral intervention too 
risky and other Great Powers, especially Russia rejected to carry out forceful 
measures.285  
As for the other major powers, Langer thinks that the French were not too 
enthusiastic on the reform proposal due to their investments in the Ottoman Empire286 
and Austria- Hungary and Germany were more in favour of status-quo.287 The 
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German ambassador to Austria, Prince Philipp Eulenburg, even echoed these views 
by telling the French Chargé that “the Armenian Question does not exist for us”.288 
 
 
5.4. The Confiscation of Armenian Church Property 
 
The advent of Alexander III brought about a firmer approach in the Tsarist 
administration in Transcaucasia. Being a part of this, The Armenian Church was still 
suspected of pursuing nefarious designs, so the High Commissioners were given the 
authority to regulate Armenian affairs very closely.289 In particular, High 
Commissioners, Dondukov-Korsakov and Golitsyn were very eager to do so. As such, 
the report on the Armenians prepared by Golitsyn in 1898 was a harbinger of what 
was to come. In this report, he blamed the Armenian Church for accommodating 
revolutionaries, who were pursuing the cause of an independent Greater Armenia.290 
He even hinted at a transfer of the properties of the Armenian schools to the Ministry 
of Education, and introduction of some check as regards Armenian dominance in the 
city councils.291 
When the time came in mid-1903 for a final decision about the Armenian 
Church, the Committee of Ministers had a majority which opposed the idea of 
confiscation since it would be an extreme act, which might radicalize the 
Armenians.292 However, given the poor perception of the Armenians in the Tsarist 
Russia, upon the recommendation of the Golitsyn and the minister of interior, 
Viacheslav K. von Plehve, Tsar Nicholas II approved the decree which annulled the 
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Polezhenie of 1836 and initiated the process of confiscation of the properties of the 
Armenian Church.  
In June 1903, the Armenian Church was deprived of its rights to supervise its 
parish schools, which were transferred to the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, 
properties of the Armenian Church were to be transferred to the ministries of Interior, 
Agriculture and State Properties.293 This was a fatal blow to the preservation of 
national Armenian culture as the Church was the most important element of Armenian 
identity. The devastating impact on the language and education would be evident 
since the majority of Armenians enrolled children in the parochial schools of their 
Church. 
The rationale of this act in Russian perspective was twofold. From the Tsarist 
perspective, the negative image of the Armenians as revolutionary was worsened by a 
series of rebellions and terrorist attacks carried out in the Ottoman Empire throughout 
the 1890’s. In line with the general understanding with the Ottoman Empire, the 
activities of Echmiadzin on the Ottoman Empire were to be seen as a potential source 
of trouble by some Tsarist officials.294 For instance, the Catholicos was blamed for 
accommodating Armenian revolutionaries, with the ideas of an ‘independent 
Armenia’.295 
Thus, this blow to the Armenian Church was conceived as a precaution against 
Armenian radicalism in the Russian Empire. The general situation was already 
problematic in Transcaucasia due to student and worker unrest so the Armenian 
Church, as the largest landowning Armenian institution, was an obvious target for 
Tsarist officials due to its economic and educational importance. Moreover, the 
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properties of the Armenian Church could be used to fund State schools, which would 
curb Armenian radicalism to a certain extent.296  
Prior to 1903, the active involvement of the Armenian Church in revolutionary 
activities in Russia was minimal, and this was severely criticized by Armenian 
revolutionary groups. They claimed that “the Armenian Church was an inert 
institution, which barely contributed to the progressive Armenian revolutionary 
movement.”297 Moreover, another important element of the community, the rising 
Armenian bourgeoisie, was not that interested in the Armenian revolutionary 
movement due to their economic interests. In order to retain their share in the 
booming Transcaucasian economy, the Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis and Baku 
preferred to get along with Russian authorities rather than cooperating with 
revolutionaries.298 The majority of the Armenian bourgeoisie even refrained from 
protesting at closure of Armenian schools in 1885.299 In return, Armenian 
revolutionaries often use terrorist means to extort funds from wealthy Armenians for 
their activities. 
Meanwhile, the position of the Armenian peasantry regarding the disturbances 
is also important. By 1897, 70% of Armenians were peasants though the stereotype of 
Armenian was often an urban middle-man.300 As such, Armenian peasants were 
experiencing huge economic difficulties towards the end of 19th century. The prices of 
agricultural products were falling globally while Russian and European manufactured 
goods were flooding the markets of Transcaucasia. As Pyotr A. Stolypin’s agrarian 
reform against semi-serfdom did not reach Transcaucasia until 1912, the majority of 
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the Armenian peasantry remained in bondage.301 In this framework, the peasants most 
of the time were inactive politically and revolutionary Armenian parties had to stand 
in for them. That the Hinchaks and Dashnaks were in effect vanguard parties was 
shown by the very low figures for their membership until 1903. 
On the other hand, the main focus of Armenian revolutionary parties was 
Ottoman Armenians and not the Russian Armenians. “The struggle against the 
‘surplus blood’ that was being extracted from the Ottoman Armenians had priority 
over the struggle against “surplus value” being extracted from Russian Armenians”.302 
This statement of Kristapor Mikayelian, one of the founders of Dashnaksutiun, clearly 
showed that his party preferred to avoid acting in the lands of the Tsar. In line with 
this policy, Dashnaksutiun even discouraged Armenian workers from participating in 
the worker strikes held in the Russian Empire prior to 1903.303  
Thus, after the act of confiscation, an Armenian Central Assembly was called 
by the Catholicos to discuss what to do next. In the assembly, the revolutionary 
elements out-weighted the clergy, who basically wanted to restore Church properties, 
not more.304 As the assembly was taken over by the revolutionaries, it was soon to be 
disbanded by the Tsarist police, though the Armenian discontent went on.305 With the 
manifestation of ‘The Plan of Action for the Caucasus’ Dashnaks openly declared 
their opposition to the Tsarist regime. Moreover, they began to emphasize the 
liberation of the Armenians of the Tsarist Russia as a part of federal system in 
Transcaucasia.306 
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Yet, the unique importance of the Armenian Church determined the degree of 
Armenian response to the Russian decision. Soon, all Armenian elements came 
together to form the Committee of Self- Defense, led by the Dashnaksutiun in the 
defense of their Church. With this initiative, several demonstrations were held by the 
Committee in Tiflis, Baku, Kars and Batum, some of which were suppressed by the 
Russian police, killing many Armenian protestors.307 As a response, Dashnaksutiun 
reinforced its opposition to the Tsarist regime by a series of violent measures. Being 
an obvious target for such measures, Golitsyn was wounded in a bombing assault by 
Hinchaks in October 1903.308  
In addition, the Tsarist act also caused a significant number of Russian 
Armenians to immigrate to the United States, Egypt, Greece and Bulgaria.309  
Although it should also be noted that the problems regarding the oil business in Baku 
played a vital role in Armenian immigration to US, the act of confiscation clearly 
increased the numbers, as Mirak demonstrates.310 The degree of the outburst was such 
that the Catholicos even suggested moving the Catholicosate from Echmiadzin to 
Ottoman domains but it was rejected by Abdülhamid II, possibly so as not to 
complicate the relations with Tsarist Russia.311 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
 




Towards the end of nineteenth century, the transformation of the Russian 
Empire came to a critical point. On the one hand, the reform process and the 
economic growth were sources of hope. Nearly doubling its industrial output, the 
Russian economy became one of the largest economies in the world by 1905. The 
efforts of the intelligentsia and increased interaction with Europe also produced a 
lively intellectual atmosphere. On the other hand, there was the Russian autocracy, 
which was anxious to modernize as fast as possible while ignoring the political 
implications of these developments. The general Tsarist position in this aspect could 
be described by Witte’s words: “Autocracy is the most efficient way of reform and 
economic modernization and it is the only way to keep a large illiterate peasant 
population of various languages and nationalities, if the Tsarist regime falls, you will 
see a total chaos in Russia.”312 Although the difficulty of holding this diverse 
population is and was obvious enough, the Tsarist authorities clearly made a mess of
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the situation and managed to alienate almost all of the elements forming the Empire 
towards 1905. 
Being one of those elements, the role of Armenians of the Tsarist Empire in 
the Revolution of 1905 could hardly be ignored when one realizes the common 
denominator of the 1905 Russian, 1906 Persian and 1908 Young Turk revolutions as 
pointed by Libaridian.313 The Russian case has its roots mainly in the shifting position 
of the Eastern Armenians during the 1880’s and 1890’s. As the Tsarist regime’s own 
perception of the Armenians gradually shifted from a Christian-ally to a revolutionary 
enemy, from 1880’s onward, the imperial authorities’ treatment of Armenians became 
oppressive. In this change, fears of the spread of Armenian radicalism in the Ottoman 
Empire, the status-quo preserving Russian foreign policy and the superior position of 
the Armenians vis-à-vis other nationalities of Transcaucasia were key factors.  
This period also saw the emergence of Armenian revolutionary parties. 
Although the political and cultural restrictions of Russification were a source of 
irritation both for revolutionaries and other segments of the Armenians of Russia, it 
was not until 1903, when the Tsarist regime decided to confiscate the properties of the 
Armenian Church that the Armenians joined the general opposition to the autocracy 
en bloc. The Tsarist attack on this institution which was a central part of the Armenian 
identity historically not only caused the Armenian revolutionaries to reverse their 
policy of avoiding operating in the Russian Empire but also increased the Armenian 
ingredient in all Russian political parties.  
In fact, the Armenian resistance was not just confined to the revolutionaries. 
At all levels, ranging from the Church to the once pro-Tsarist bourgeoisie, the Russian 
Armenians were at work to defeat Tsarist authority in Transcaucasia in the pre-1905 
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period. As general unrest in the empire was worsened by the failures of the war with 
Japan, the Armenians were determined to make an impact. 
  
 
6.1. The Empire on the Verge of Explosion 
 
The transformation of Russian economy was accelerated with Witte’s 
industrialization drive in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Observing the 
catastrophic results of the excessive pressures put on the countryside in the famine of 
1891, Witte favored attracting foreign capital to finance railroad construction and 
heavy industrial build-up.314 This modernization process inevitably contributed to the 
social and national movements of the nationalities of the Empire.315 
Meanwhile, the Empire was also experiencing a population boom in pre-1905 
period, one of the highest growth figures in Europe at that time.316 Her European 
counterparts could deal with this phenomenon with rapid industrialization and 
emigration both of which Russia could not manage. More importantly, the population 
growth obviously had a negative impact on the average allotment of a peasant in the 
Empire, which gradually fell towards 1905.317  
In addition to the general population boom in the Russian Empire, many 
Armenians from the Ottoman Empire found their ways to Tiflis, Baku and Batum, 
especially after the 1894-96 massacres.318 Not surprisingly, this agrarian problem was 
one of the most critical items on the agenda of the opponents of autocracy prior to 
                                               
314
 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 77. 
315
 Kappeler, 283. 
316
 Pipes, 101-103. 
317
 Ibid. 101. 
318
 Anahide Ter Minassian, “The City of Van at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” in Armenian Van/ 
Vaspurakan, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2000), 182. 
 75 
1905, as well as that of the Dashnaks, whose definition of nation was changed to 
include only peasants and workers.319 Although the price of grain remained generally 
stable between 1885 and 1900, increased tax obligations and increased prices of land 
probably cancelled out any gains from the stability of grain prices.320  
As Witte began to realize his economic objectives, this naturally brought about 
the emergence of a labor movement in industrial centers including Transcaucasia 
beginning from 1890’s. In this period, it would be reasonable to consider the 
movement as one demanding basic worker rights such as higher wages and reasonable 
working hours. However, by the early twentieth century, worker dissent began to 
merge with peasant and student demonstrations in a more complex political 
phenomenon. Although the workers comprised a tiny fraction of the population (1.28 
% by 1900), their general strikes, 1902 in Rostov and 1903 in the Caucasus, made a 




6.2. Armenian Collaboration with Other Political Parties 
 
Armenians were also a part of this unrest in the Empire. It is no coincidence 
that this chaotic environment also witnessed the rise of various political parties, which 
combined to shape Russian politics. Thus, the fate of the Armenians in Russia was to 
be affected not only by the Armenian Dashnaksutiun but also by such parties as the 
Russian SRs, Kadets, Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP) and 
others.  
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However, an interesting feature of Armenian revolutionary movement up to 
1903 was its sole focus on the Ottoman Empire while avoiding acting in Russian 
Empire. This could be partly explained by their lack of power and the logic of 
channeling their energies to a single domain, Ottoman Empire, where the position of 
Armenian lot was supposed to be much worse than the ones under Russian rule.322 
Yet, if the ideal is to get rid of autocracy, then Russian autocracy had to be challenged 
as well. This was partially expressed by Karl Liebknecht, when he called the 
Armenian revolutionaries “the tools of Russian expansionism since they were striving 
for an Armenian homeland in Anatolia, and not against the Tsarist autocracy.”323 
Finally, with the Tsarist decision to confiscate the properties of the Armenian 
Church in 1903, the Armenian opposition to the regime started. In this process, while 
Armenian revolutionary parties intensified their relations with other parties, a certain 
number of Armenians joined the ranks of these parties, both of which meant more 
Russian revolutionary tutelage.   
Being the descendants of Russian populist movement, the SR Party was a very 
influential party, which carried out systemic terrorist attacks and agitation like 
Dashnaks on the eve of 1905 Revolution.324 For instance, the assassination of the 
notorious minister of Internal Affairs, Plehve in July 1904 by SR terrorists was 
welcomed by various groups including Hinchaks and Dashnaks.325 Moreover, a 
general tendency of the Russian revolutionaries of the day, expropriations was also 
conducted by the SRs. Dashnaks were not unfamiliar with these techniques. As early 
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as 1901, in order to overcome their financial difficulties, they accepted as a principle 
the extortion of money, mainly from wealthy Armenians.326 With the start of 
opposition to Tsarism, this process, called ‘operation Potorig (Storm)’ by the 
Dashnaks, accelerated and produced a considerable amount of funds, nearly 160.000 
roubles by 1904.327 Likewise, the two parties actively cooperated in Baku during the 
1905 events. SRs formally declared that they would assist Dashnaks in their struggle 
with Tsarist forces.328 
Under these circumstances, Armenian collaboration with other disgruntled 
groups accelerated towards 1905. An important event in that aspect was that in 
November 1904, Dashnaks joined the conference in Paris, where the representatives 
of the Kadets, the SRs, the Polish National League, the Finnish Active Resistance 
Party, the Georgian Socialist-Federalist Party and the Latvian Social Democratic 
Labour Party met so as to form a coordinated body to resist the Tsarist regime.329 
Most Social Democrats boycotted this gathering fearing that the liberals would 
dominate a coordinated movement.330 Nevertheless, the Dashnaks approved the 
decisions taken at this congress, which called for the overthrow of the autocracy and 
the self-determination principle.331  
Until 1903, different brands of Marxism had relatively little influence on the 
Armenians. With its romantic aspect and focus on the importance of the peasantry, the 
Russian populism seemed to be more suitable to the Armenian revolutionaries than 
the Marxist doctrine, which considered nationality as a false consciousness or perhaps 
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as a useful idiocy.332 In a sense, the urgent target of liberating the fatherland could not 
wait the transition to bourgeois capitalism and then to socialism, and for some it was 
only feasible in the industrialized West.333 Another reason for the initial failure of 
Social Democracy among the Armenians was that it was mainly considered as a 
Georgian phenomenon, as evidenced by the example that the Tiflis branch of RSDWP 
had only Georgian members in 1899.334 In addition, the emancipation of the worker 
rather than the emancipation of Armenians did not make an effective appeal to the 
Armenians as a whole.335 
The origins of Marxist movement among Armenians could be traced back to 
the Marxist Armenian Worker’s Group, which was founded in 1898 in Tiflis and 
disbanded in 1901.336 The main contribution of this group was its critique of 
Dashnaks and Hinchaks on their emphasis on nationality and the Ottoman 
Armenians.337 As they were disbanded, Marxist groups began to be more effective 
among the Armenian community as the dissent of Armenians was further complicated 
by the general problems in the Empire.  
From then on, the Marxist movement among Armenians was mainly carried 
on by two groups. The first of these was the Specifists, who believed in the 
uniqueness of the Armenian case, and used Marxist paradigm to resolve the problems 
of Armenians.338 Most of these people were former RSDWP members, who had left 
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the party due to its lack of emphasis on the Armenian Question.339 Specifists argued 
that “the Ottoman Empire would disintegrate and that Western Armenia would fall to 
Russia’s share.” In such a case, a socialist Russia on federalist lines would be the 
salvation for Armenians as well as other nationalities.340 Their proposed solution was 
not unlike that of the Jewish Bund, who advocated extra-territorial autonomy on 
Austro-Marxist lines.341 
Other group was the Union of Armenian Social Democrats, which had already 
established its local branches in Tiflis, Baku and Batum by 1899. Later, in 1903, it 
merged into the Caucasian Union of RSDWP. Led by Stepan Shahumian and Arshak 
Zurabian, this group adopted a more orthodox Marxist point of view and criticized 
both Specifists and Dashnaksutiun for falling into the nationalist trap.342 For them, the 
focus should have been on the class struggle not nationality. Still, after 1903, the 
emergence of a Transcaucasian labor movement had attracted more Armenian 
element into their ranks. As the split in RSDWP became acute in 1903, Armenians 
more tended to side more with the Bolsheviks as opposed to Georgians, who generally 
preferred the Menshevik faction.343 
Contrary to the expectations of socialists, however, the Armenian proletariat 
was mostly hired by the Armenian firms at the demand of the Armenian Church.344 
These national divisions among the workers were further strengthened by the 
Dashnak strategy. Their emphasis on the national demands, with a view to deterring 
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any possible defection by some Armenian elements to other political parties could be 
the main reasons for this.345   
Therefore, even on the eve of 1905 Revolution, when the labour movement 
was at its peak, Suny notes that Armenian, Georgian and Muslim labourers did share 
little in terms of class fraternity, while national and religious bonds were still 
prevalent.346 Class solidarity was hardly the right term. Thus, the solution for all 
parties in Transcaucasia was to add national and socialist tones into their programme 
since national conflict went together with the social one, as Figes asserts.347  
Not surprisingly the Dashnaks also followed the pattern. By early 1905, the 
Dashnaks declared their ‘Plan of Action for the Caucasus’, which included increased 
socialist content in line with the general tendency of the day.348 By participating in the 
Caucasian Platform of 1905, Dashnaksutiun officially allowed its party cells to 
cooperate with other socialist groups.349 Based on the general economic difficulties 
and the position of the Church, this move enabled the party to increase its appeal 
among youth and Armenian workers.350 In Baku, Dashnaks managed to form ten trade 
unions, with a total membership number of 2000 by 1905.351 Thus, other socialist 
groups, the SRs and RSDWP, were able to recruit only smaller numbers of Armenians 
into their ranks in the years around 1905.352 
An interesting aspect of the Caucasian Union of RSDWP certainly lies with 
Stalin’s involvement in revolutionary affairs.353 Although the union was formed in 
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March 1903, Stalin could not join until 1904 since he was in jail at that time.354 As 
soon as he came to Baku, he challenged Shahumian for the leadership of Bolshevik 
groups in Transcaucasia, but he failed for the time being. Ulam thinks that 
Shahumian’s education at the universities of Riga and Berlin as well as his familiarity 
with Marxist doctrine gave him an advantage for leadership of the Bolshevik 
movement in Transcaucasia.355 
 These developments were complicated by general problems in the Empire. 
Nearly all parts of the Russian Empire were suffering from serious economic troubles. 
There was inflation, accompanying the bad news from Tsushima. Worker strikes went 
together with peasant unrest in the countryside. The ultimate defeat of the Russian 
army at the hands of the Japanese in 1904-05 War further diminished the Tsarist 
regime’s credibility in the minds of her subjects. 
 
 
6.3. Armenian- Azeri Clashes 
 
While Armenian participation in the general revolutionary movement in the 
Empire had a certain impact on Russian politics, the chaotic atmosphere leading up to 
1905 Revolution produced tragic results for the Armenians. In February 1905, 
Armenian-Azeri clashes began at many points in Transcaucasia. Mutual massacres 
took place in both sides roughly until the spring of 1906. Starting in February 1905, 
clashes spread to Nakhichevan, Shusha and at last Tiflis and Baku in November.356 
The clashes ended in the destruction of both Armenian and Muslim villages, 
                                               
354




 Altsdart, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, 40. 
 82 
especially in the Karabagh region.357 Moreover, monarchists groups of Baku also beat 
the Armenians as they disliked them for not being Orthodox Christians and for their 
revolutionary image, killing 60 of them.358 
The inefficiency of the Russian administration in these clashes was criticized 
by both Azeri leaders and Dashnaks.359 This was clearly claimed by an Azeri deputy 
in the first state Duma in June 1906, when he asserted that the Russians were 
intentionally provoking inter-ethnic clashes.360 Soviet sources, not unsurprisingly, 
blame the Tsarist administration, the governor of Baku, Prince Nakashidze, in 
particular.361 
While there might be a motive for the Russian authorities to have a divide and 
rule policy, it must be also noted that the Tsarist administration in Caucasus was 
chronically understaffed and underpaid. During 1905-1906, while other regions were 
given 20 million roubles for pacification efforts, the Caucasus got nothing.362 
Accordingly, the number of trained policemen and their salaries were very low, which 
partially explains the Tsarist forces’ failure to act effectively to end the clashes.363 At 
some point, the governors and the Okhrana were so desperate that they put all their 
hopes in the efforts of janitors for the gathering of intelligence about revolutionary 
movement.364 
Finally, in August 1905, Nicholas II annulled the 1903 decree, as new 
governor Count Illarion I. Vorontsov-Dashkov suggested. This move, it was hoped, 
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would help the conservative element in the Armenian Church to curb the dynamism 
of the Armenian revolutionary movement.365 Another consideration was related to the 
Muslim demographic majority and a possible alliance with Ottoman Empire. In a 
letter to Tsar, Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote that “Armenians and Georgians would not 
go for separatism in the midst of Muslims but support the Russian rule while Muslim 
separatism would be the most problematic option for Russia”.366  
 
 
6.4. The End of the Revolution 
 
With the October Manifesto and the annulment of the decree regarding the 
confiscation of the Church property, the Armenian revolutionary movement lost pace 
towards the end of 1905. By then, the Armenian bourgeoisie and the clergy were 
ready to cooperate with the Tsarist system while peasants organized demonstrations 
of demonstrations of gratitude and loyalty.367 
Overall, the legacy of the 1905 on the Armenian revolutionary movement was 
twofold. In the first place, by incorporating socialist themes in their programme and 
making tactical alliances with the Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, the 
Dashnaks, in a sense, moved away from their strict national party character, which 
was still more dominant.368 As such, in January 1906, they found themselves 
publishing Harach (Forward) in Tiflis, in which they translated Russian socialist and 
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populist literature into Armenian.369 The socialist influence was to increase in 
Armenian circles, which ultimately ended in Dashnak participation in the congress of 
the Second International in 1907.  
Another consequence of this change caused Armenian revolutionaries, 
Dashnaks in particular, to be more flexible in their relations with the Young Turks 
organizations abroad. An influential Dashnak, Aknouni had undertaken talks with 
Young Turks in May 1905, even while the Armeno-Azeri conflict went on.370 In 
effect, a prominent Young Turk, Abdullah Cevdet himself went so far as to appeal to 
the Muslims to end the fighting.371  
 Around 1905, even loyal supporters of the Tsarist regime saw that the system 
was not working. Almost all segments of the Empire, both in socio-political and 
national terms, had problems of their own and the only response of the Russian 
autocracy was to intensify police-state character and declare war on Japan. Armenians 
were unquestionably one of these discontented groups in this multi-national Empire. 
It was the Confiscation of the Armenian Church by Tsarist regime, which 
determined the role of Armenians in the making of 1905 Revolution. Since the 
Armenian Church was the institution which preserved the Armenian identity both in 
religious and linguistic terms, the Russian take-over was perceived as a threat to the 
essence of the Armenian community, which ended up with in mass opposition to the 
autocracy. 
Led by the Dashnaks, the Armenian resistance made things worse for the 
Tsarist authorities in Transcaucasia. Using their experience in the Ottoman Empire, 
Armenian revolutionaries assassinated many Tsarist officials. In addition, the 
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Dashnaks cooperated with other influential Russian political parties to organize 
general strikes and protests. This contribution of the Armenian groupings becomes 
quite significant, given the context of ‘Bloody Sunday’.  
Apart from the activities of Dashnaks, Armenians also joined other parties, 
which ultimately produced crucial figures like Shahumian. As the upheaval in the 
country was worsened by the news of the debacle in the Far East and the inability of 
Tsarist regime to respond, the Armenians were learning how to make revolution, 
which would be a decisive factor a few years later in the fate of neighboring empires. 
The 1905 experience for the Armenian revolutionary movement demonstrated 
that terror and armed resistance formed a useful way to force a mighty Empire to 
make concessions.372 Moreover, Hovannisian claims that Armenian national 
consciousness and organization skills were strengthened by the struggle with the 
Azeris, despite the heavy toll.373 This was an important factor in the behavior of 
Armenian revolutionaries in their activities in Russia and the Ottoman lands in the 
years to come, particularly when the prospects of the collaboration with the Young 
Turks finally withered away. Armenian revolutionaries had now an idea what to do.
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By 1907, matters had developed between Tsarist Russia and the Armenians in 
a manner very different from what had been hoped by the Armenian political leaders, 
churchmen and intelligentsia back in the days when Russian liberators, entering the 
fortress of Kars with Armenian generals in 1878. By 1907, the revolutionary 
Armenians were being subjected to a mass-trial. Armenian writers, lawyers, doctors 
and even the closest allies of the Tsarist regime, the merchants, were included in this 
trial, which dragged on from 1907 to 1912.  Their defence lawyer was the future 
Premier Alexander F. Kerensky.374 Very early on, the speech of Arshak Zurabian, a 
former Dashnak, in which he criticized the Tsarist Army, was to create a serious 
crisis, ending with the Stolypin coup d’état in June 1907.375 
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 A curious and in its way beneficent side-effect of the Tsarist-Russian collision 
with Armenian revolutionaries in this period came in a Turkish context: there was, for 
the first time, a joint Armenian-Turkish opposition to Abdülhamid’s regime a year 
later, in 1908, when a group of angry Armenian and Muslim women raided a wheat 
granary and broke the windows of the sub-prefects’s office in Arapgir, in the province 
of Ma’muret el-Aziz as a protest against grain prices.376 However, these cordial 
relations would not last long. Some twelve years later, the fortress of Kars would 
witness a different drama for the Armenian revolutionaries.  They fled, and a treaty in 
1921 confirmed new borders to the east of the town.  
The Tsarist factor in this disappointment was important. The process of the 
Armenian national awakening period was the result of a combination of political, 
economic and cultural developments within the nation. Along with the Ottoman 
Armenians, it was the Armenians of Tiflis, Baku or Erevan who made the awakening 
possible. While the reform of the language, the expansion of schools and the creation 
of a vigorous new literature was made possible through the efforts of Russian 
Armenian intellectuals, the industrious Armenian bourgeoisie of Transcaucasia 
provided the material basis for this. 
While the Tsarist administration was trying to extend its reforms into this 
‘warm Siberia’ – as they termed the Caucasus – by the 1870’s, it was in fact the 
Armenians who ran the place, and all travelers noticed this. The advent of the 
railways, telegraph and the boom of the oil industry not only empowered the 
Armenian bourgeoisie but also tempted the Armenian villager from the countryside of 
Erevan to try his chances in Tiflis or Baku, where he would read about Raffi’s 
national heroes, of whom he might never before have heard.  On the other hand, other 
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major inhabitants of the region, Georgians and Azeris, were forming different 
thoughts as to their neighbours.  They could hardly be ignored, even in the fine flush 
of the Armenian renaissance.  
Some Armenians fell under the influence of the Russian revolutionary 
movement. While the works of Nechaev, Lavrov or Tkachev provide a theoretical 
basis, it was the People’s Will, which inspired some Armenians to put theory into 
practice. Soon, the Armenian national awakening had found its environment to 
flourish in Tsarist Russia by drawing on the experience of the Russian revolutionaries, 
especially after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. 
However, the machinations of these Armenian revolutionaries became 
complicated as a series of Tsarist domestic and foreign policy priorities blocked their 
ways. As the Russification measures brought about restrictions on Armenian cultural 
sphere, there were also Tsarist suspicions about the Armenian Catholicosate. The 
activities of Armenian revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire made the Tsarist regime 
even more anxious, especially at a time when Russia had a certain understanding with 
the Sultan. 
Coupled with the hostilities related to the competition in demography, jobs 
and political primacy with Georgians and Azeris, the Russian Armenians were 
depicted negatively by the top Tsarist officials in Transcaucasia, which eventually 
resulted in an extreme measure of the confiscation of the properties of the Armenian 
Church in 1903. While this created an immense opposition from the Russian 
Armenians at all levels, the problems of the Empire grew as general strikes were 
almost constant and bad news poured in from the Far East. 
It was the course of the Revolution of 1905 that added a new dimension to the 
Armenian revolutionary movement, which gained support from its Russian 
 89 
counterpart. The tactical alliances with other revolutionary parties, along with the 
social problems, forced Armenian revolutionary parties to add more socialist themes 
such as the Austro-Marxist extra-territorial autonomy or a Transcaucasian federation 
into their agenda instead of a sole emphasis on the ‘Turkish yoke’.   
 However, the aftermath of the Revolution was a massive disappointment.  In 
1906, Stolypin was complaining about the annulment of the act of confiscation that it 
gave Echmiadzin the opportunity to be the center for Armenian revolutionary 
movement in the Tsarist lands.377 The situation of Armenian revolutionary parties was 
no better; many members were arrested; some, like Aknouni, thought that they had to 
try to reach an agreement with the Turks, which they did soon although it was not to 
last very long.378  
The later nineteenth century was a period of enormous promise for the Russian 
Armenians, and the purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate as much. However, 
this bright prospect of the Russian Armenians was shattered as the Tsarist domestic 
and foreign policy perspectives changed and confronted the Armenian national 
awakening, which produced complicated results as the Armenian affiliation with the 
Russian revolutionary movement intensified. With the act of confiscation and the 
chaotic atmosphere of the 1905 Revolution, the reversal of the Armenian fortunes in 
Tsarist Russia completed most of its course, making the Armenian revolutionaries 
think on what needs to be done next. 
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